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This joint article reflects the authors’ personal views regarding noteworthy advances in
the neuroscience of consciousness in the last 10 years, and suggests what we feel may
be promising future directions. It is based on a small conference at the Samoset Resort
in Rockport, Maine, USA, in July of 2012, organized by the Mind Science Foundation
of San Antonio, Texas. Here, we summarize recent advances in our understanding of
subjectivity in humans and other animals, including empirical, applied, technical, and
conceptual insights. These include the evidence for the importance of fronto-parietal
connectivity and of “top-down” processes, both of which enable information to travel
across distant cortical areas effectively, as well as numerous dissociations between
consciousness and cognitive functions, such as attention, in humans. In addition, we
describe the development of mental imagery paradigms, which made it possible to identify
covert awareness in non-responsive subjects. Non-human animal consciousness research
has also witnessed substantial advances on the specific role of cortical areas and higher
order thalamus for consciousness, thanks to important technological enhancements. In
addition, much progress has been made in the understanding of non-vertebrate cognition
relevant to possible conscious states. Finally, major advances have been made in theories
of consciousness, and also in their comparison with the available evidence. Along with
reviewing these findings, each author suggests future avenues for research in their field
of investigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Due tomany technical and conceptual advances, the neuroscience
of consciousness has witnessed considerable progress over the
last decade. During a meeting in summer 2012, we practiced
the difficult exercise of synthesizing what we felt were the most
outstanding recent advances in the field and what we believed
represent promising avenues for further progress. At the con-
clusion of the meeting, we decided that the outcome of this
discussion might be of interest to other researchers in the field,
and could potentially provoke stimulating and fruitful dialogue.
Recent groundbreaking brain imaging studies have enabled sci-
entists and clinicians to detect the presence of consciousness in
some patients who appear to have lost consciousness by exist-
ing clinical criteria. Actual loss of consciousness due to various
causes is typically accompanied by breakdown of brains’ capac-
ity to integrate neuronal activity across distant areas, especially
via top-down or reentrant connectivity supported by the integrity
of fronto-parietal areas. In normal healthy humans, the contents
of consciousness have been examined mainly with psychophysi-
cal and neuroimaging techniques, uncovering that consciousness
may be neither sufficient nor necessary for high-level cognitive
functions, such as attention, cognitive control, and volition, at
least in simple form. Non-human animal consciousness research
has also witnessed groundbreaking advances in the study of con-
tents of consciousness by employing perceptual rivalry paradigms
and elucidating the effect of reversible thalamic and cortical
inactivations. We also review recent progress in our knowledge
of phylogenetic origins of consciousness through comparative
studies of non-vertebrate cognition. Finally, recent years have
witnessed major theoretical advances, and signs of convergence
between theories and evidence. Given the progress seen in the last
decade, the coming years will, no doubt, continue to be exciting
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times for investigators seeking to deepen our understanding of the
neuroscientific basis of conscious experience.
ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS SCIENCE IN HUMANS AND
ANIMALS: A 10-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE
In this section, we will describe what we feel are important
advances in consciousness science in the last 10 years. We will first
provide a brief overview of advances made in the study of altered
levels of consciousness (i.e., those due to brain damage, anesthe-
sia, seizures, or during sleep). We will then discuss some major
conceptual and practical advances in the study of neural corre-
lates of conscious contents in healthy awake volunteers (HAVs).
Reflecting these two questions, it is critical at the outset to distin-
guish between the search for neural correlates or underpinnings
of conscious level and of conscious content. This distinction
between will recur throughout our discussion.We will also review
critical issues and advances in the study of contents of con-
sciousness in non-human animals. Finally, we will discuss several
neuroscientific theories that have become increasingly influential
over the last decade, focusing on how each individually addresses
the problem of consciousness. Due to space limitations, several
important topics will not be covered here: (i) the neuroscience
of conscious selfhood, including “out-of-body” experiences, and
other manipulations of the experience of “body ownership,” (ii)
related notions of emotions, intention, volition, agency, and the
suggested role of consciousness in social cognition (Frith and
Frith, 2007), (iii) disorders of conscious content (such as hallu-
cinations, delusions, and neuropsychiatric conditions generally),
(iv) the effects of psychotropic substances on consciousness and
(v) changes in conscious contents in meditative, hypnotic, and
similar states.
ALTERED LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN HUMANS
The study of altered levels of consciousness such as coma or anes-
thesia has provided clinical, ethical and even legal motivations for
the neuroscientific study of consciousness (Laureys and Schiff,
2012) (Figure 1). A better understanding of the links between
consciousness and the brain is indeed required to better charac-
terize neural markers of consciousness in these states (Boly et al.,
2009). An improved understanding could also facilitate new treat-
ments for severely brain-damaged patients (Schiff, 2010). Finally,
the issue of awareness under anesthesia merits greater scrutiny,
particularly given the evidence that such episodes may commonly
be missed by applying the various techniques currently used to
monitor brain function under sedation (Avidan et al., 2011).
Recent advances in functional imaging and electrophysio-
logical techniques (encompassing functional MRI, EEG, and
intracranial recordings) applied in these contexts have signifi-
cantly expanded our knowledge of neural correlates of conscious
level in humans. Accordingly, some outstanding advances in this
field are summarized below.
Severe brain damaged patients: coma, vegetative state (VS), and
minimally conscious states (MCS)
Research on altered states of consciousness due to brain damage
has greatly benefited from the definition of the minimally
conscious state (MCS), provided by Giacino et al. (2002). Since
FIGURE 1 | Level and contents of consciousness. The level of
consciousness can be dissociated from behaviors that are traditionally
regarded as a signs of vigilance or arousal (such as opening of eyes,
command following etc.). Typically, high conscious levels are associated
with an increased range of conscious contents. Whether or not high level
of consciousness without any conscious contents is possible remains
unclear. Adapted from Laureys (2005), courtesy of Giulio Tononi.
the introduction of this definition, a number of studies have
shown significant differences in brain function between vegetative
and minimally conscious state patient populations (Boly, 2011).
Brain function in patients in the vegetative state (VS) is very sim-
ilar to that during sleep and anesthesia, and is characterized by an
impaired function of thalamus and fronto-parietal cortical areas
(Laureys et al., 2000a,b, 2002; Laureys, 2005). In contrast, brain
function in MCS is much closer to that observed in HAVs, with
the preservation of functional connectivity (temporal correlation
patterns between cortical areas) and activation in frontal and
parietal cortical areas (Boly et al., 2004, 2008a; Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2010; Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2012). What makes con-
scious patients in MCS appear unconscious like VS patients is the
lack of motor functions, including speech, which renders patients
non-communicative. In addition to differences in brain activa-
tion and functional connectivity, recent electroencephalography
(EEG) studies have revealed that MCS patients, in contrast to
VS patients, show preserved “top-down” or recurrent process-
ing in higher-order cortical areas (Boly et al., 2011) (Figure 2).
Furthermore, the brains of the MCS patients and normal healthy
people react to a single pulse of transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) in a similar way (Rosanova et al., 2012); TMS-evoked EEG
response is variable across trials, spreads across widely distributed
cortical areas and reveals much more complicated and sustained
dynamics than those evoked in the VS patients’ brains (also see
Casali et al. (2013) the following section on anesthesia (Ferrarelli
et al., 2010) and sleep (Massimini et al., 2005) on this TMS-EEG
perturbational approach).
The application of new technologies for the assessment of
brain function in patients following severe brain injury has led
to increasing refinement and differentiation of the taxonomy of
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FIGURE 2 | PET studies reveal hypometabolism in similar
fronto-parietal areas in vegetative and anesthesia (areas in blue, left
panel). Recent dynamic causal modeling studies also suggest a loss of
top-down (reentrant) connectivity in fronto-parietal cortices in both
vegetative state (left panel, assessed for response to auditory stimuli) and
propofol anesthesia (right panel, assessed from spontaneous EEG).
Adapted from Boly et al. (2011, 2012a). ∗Significant difference between
conditions (corrected p < 0.05).
impairments of consciousness (Figure 1). New refinements of
clinical definitions are ongoing, with the current classification
of patients in MCS as “MCS−” and “MCS+,” depending on
the presence or absence of response to commands during clin-
ical examination (Laureys and Schiff, 2012). A recent PET study
showed that “MCS+” patients display preserved left-sided fronto-
parietal activity as compared to the “MCS-” population (Bruno
et al., 2012).
Another revolutionary advance in the field of neuroimaging of
non-communicative brain damaged patients has been the design
of active paradigms, in which responses to commands are probed
while bypassing motor outputs [(Boly et al., 2007b); see Boly and
Seth (2012) for a review]. The first paradigms employed in this
context probed motor or spatial navigation imagery using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Owen et al., 2006;
Monti et al., 2010) (Figure 3). Some EEG equivalents for these
paradigms have also been designed to enable communication
with patients outside of the MRI-scanner, even at their home
(Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Cruse et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2011).
Active paradigms typically reveal that about 20% of VS patients
can respond to commands in an intentional manner (Monti et al.,
2010; Cruse et al., 2011). While those responding patients are
likely to be conscious, non-responsive patients in these paradigms
might also be conscious, but not recognized as such due to
the insensitivity of these methods. Active paradigms (asking the
patients to perform a task, even without motor output) indeed
heavily rely on the collaboration of the patients, as well as on
intact language capabilities. In fact, it has been shown that some
MCS or locked-in syndrome patients, who are conscious, can
respond to commands at the bedside, however, they occasion-
ally do not show task-relevant brain activation in response to
the instruction to perform the task (Bardin et al., 2011). This
FIGURE 3 | Mental imagery paradigm used to detect covert awareness
in non-communicating patients. An activation of motor cortex in
response to a motor imagery task instruction (“imagine playing tennis,” on
the left) or an activation of parahippocampal gyrus in response to the
instruction to perform a spatial navigation mental imagery task (“imagine
visiting your home,” right) can be considered as evidence of response to
command, and thus of the presence of awareness, in patients
unresponsive at the bedside. Reproduced with permission from (Owen
et al., 2006).
finding reinforces the need for more specific identification poten-
tially sufficient neural correlates of conscious level in order to
detect awareness in patients who do not respond to these tasks.
Such research would also inform psychophysiological measures
of awareness that do not rely on preserved language comprehen-
sion and volition in patients (Scott et al., 2011). As we will see
later, the criterion of “sufficiency” regarding neural correlates of
consciousness is where recent advances in theory are extremely
pertinent.
Finally, the last few years have witnessed the emergence of
new treatments for patients with disorders of consciousness. For
example, medial thalamic stimulation has proven beneficial for
the recovery of responsiveness in someMCS patients (Schiff et al.,
2007), suggesting an important role for the thalamus in con-
sciousness. Amantadine, a dopaminergic drug (Giacino et al.,
2012), and surprisingly zolpidem, a GABAergic agonist (Whyte
and Myers, 2009), have also proven beneficial in some cases of
VS or MCS. While the foregoing progress is indeed encouraging,
considerable research is still needed in this field.
Anesthesia
Similar to what is observed in the VS, brain correlates of gen-
eral anesthesia commonly involve a functional impairment of
thalamus and fronto-parietal areas (Alkire and Miller, 2005).
While general anesthesia-induced loss of consciousness (LOC)
disrupts functional connectivity within fronto-parietal areas and
between fronto-parietal areas and the thalamus, it can leave
thalamo-cortical connectivity in low-level sensory cortical areas
unchanged (Boveroux et al., 2010). The development of clin-
ically applicable electrophysiological markers of consciousness
during general anesthesia therefore remains an important goal
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(Avidan et al., 2011). Recent studies, using respectively, high den-
sity EEG (Murphy et al., 2011; Purdon et al., 2013) and intracra-
nial recordings (Lewis et al., 2012), suggest that increased slow
wave activity might be one of the most reliable correlates of LOC
under general anesthesia, and subsequent recovery of conscious-
ness (Purdon et al., 2013). Nevertheless, further clinical validation
of this marker is needed. Recent EEG studies also provide some
evidence that, again similar to what is found in the VS, general
anesthesia might be characterized by stereotypical responses to
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Ferrarelli et al., 2010;
Casali et al., 2013) and disruption of “top-down” functional con-
nectivity from frontal to sensory areas (Imas et al., 2005; Lee
et al., 2009; Boly et al., 2012a). Interestingly, general anesthesia-
induced LOC might also be associated with decreased inhibition
in response to external stimulation (Haider et al., 2013), and
may also be related to increased synchrony and Granger causal-
ity (the latter measures temporal causality between time series) in
beta (15–25Hz) and gamma (25–40Hz) ranges between fronto-
parietal midline areas (Murphy et al., 2011; Barrett et al., 2012)
(but also see Figure 2B). Note that while increased gamma syn-
chrony may not be key for sustaining the level of consciousness,
as mentioned here, may also play a role in encoding some aspects
of contents of consciousness, as reviewed later.
Sleep
Neural correlates of reduced consciousness during non-rapid eye
movement (NREM) sleep obtained using intracranial recordings
and fMRI also indicate decreased activity and functional con-
nectivity in fronto-parietal areas (Horovitz et al., 2009; Samann
et al., 2011; Boly et al., 2012b; Nobili et al., 2012). Recent intracra-
nial studies in humans further suggest that NREM sleep occurs
primarily at a local level, that is, during this state, the majority
of correlated neural activity takes place in isolated modules (Nir
et al., 2011). Similarly, TMS-EEG studies have shown decreased
effective connectivity (causal interactions in response to pertur-
bation, for example, by a single TMS pulse) and stereotypical
patterns of neural responses during NREM sleep (Massimini
et al., 2005, 2007; Casali et al., 2013). Recently, however, fMRI
studies have confirmed that NREM sleep is a dynamic state.
Indeed, both sleep slow waves and spindles induce activation of
many thalamo-cortical areas (Schabus et al., 2007; Dang-Vu et al.,
2008), but decrease the processing of external stimuli (Dang-Vu
et al., 2011; Schabus et al., 2012).
Relatively few studies have investigated brain function dur-
ing rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. In contrast to NREM
sleep, REM sleep is associated with a high percentage of dream
reports at awakening (Nir and Tononi, 2010) reflecting conscious
states. Nonetheless, brains in the REM sleep compared to those in
awake state respond less to external stimuli (Wehrle et al., 2007).
Nonetheless, it remains unclear why perception of environmen-
tal stimuli is lost during REM sleep. A recent study involving
lucid dreamers (who can master preserved control over the con-
tents of their dreams) investigated potential neural correlates of
conscious content during REM sleep (Dresler et al., 2011), find-
ing as during normal wakefulness, a correlation between motor
imagery dream contents and fMRI activation in the motor cor-
tex. Interestingly, normal REM sleep is associated with reduced
gamma activity (Voss et al., 2009) and reduced fronto-parietal
metabolism (Dresler et al., 2012) as compared to lucid dreaming.
At the sleep onset, a recent fMRI study succeeded to decode more
refined conscious contents of visual imagery (Horikawa et al.,
2013). Future studies are warranted to better understand the neu-
ral correlates underlying changes in conscious level amongNREM
sleep, REM sleep, and normal waking consciousness.
Epilepsy
Neural correlates of epilepsy-induced LOC are preferentially
located in the thalamus and fronto-parietal areas (Blumenfeld,
2005; Laureys, 2005); but, the various seizure types differ in how
these areas are implicated. While absence seizures (with brief sus-
pension of conscious content, but preserved tonus) and other
spike-wave seizures, when associated to LOC, provoke a decrease
in fronto-parietal activity (Blumenfeld et al., 2004; Englot et al.,
2009), the tonic phase of generalized tonic-clonic seizures induces
a widespread increase in fronto-parietal metabolism as compared
to baseline (Blumenfeld et al., 2003). Several intracranial record-
ings in humans have also shown that temporal and parietal lobe
seizure-induced LOC is associated with a widespread increase
in neural synchrony (Arthuis et al., 2009; Lambert et al., 2012).
These results suggest that LOC in epilepsy could be induced due
to neural hypersynchrony, impairing the differentiation of neu-
ronal activity within and between cortical areas. To date, data
concerning the presence of stereotypical activity in response to
perturbation (which could provide direct evidence for reduced
effective connectivity) during seizure-induced LOC are missing.
The search for a common principle among different unconscious
states
Is there a common principle underlying loss of consciousness
(LOC) induced by variable causes, due to severe brain injury,
general anesthesia, sleep, and seizures (Figure 1)? In recent years,
efforts have been made to identify potential common neuronal
mechanisms for LOC.
Anatomical connections and minimal activation in the fronto-
parietal areas. As already mentioned, changes in the activation
in fronto-parietal areas are commonly observed in states associ-
ated with LOC (Baars et al., 2003; Tononi and Koch, 2008; Bor
and Seth, 2012) even if the nature of alteration may vary for
each cause. Anatomical connections of the fronto-parietal areas
(particularly the precuneus) also suggest their critical role in sus-
taining the level of consciousness. As central hubs of human brain
anatomical connectivity (Hagmann et al., 2008; Buckner et al.,
2009), these areas have extensive anatomical and functional rela-
tionships, supporting many high-level cognitive functions, such
as attention and executive functions. Based on these observations,
some authors have argued that the integrity of the fronto-parietal
networks may be necessary for consciousness to occur (Demertzi
et al., 2013).
However, increasing evidence in HAVs (see below) suggests
that in humans, many, if not all, cognitive functions that involve
fronto-parietal areas can also operate in the absence of reportable
conscious perception of the relevant stimuli, even if performance
is usually much diminished (Boly and Seth, 2012; van Gaal and
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Lamme, 2012). Furthermore, the highest level of metabolic activ-
ity in awake human subjects was located in the primary visual
cortex, not in the fronto-parietal cortical areas (Vaishnavi et al.,
2010). This is counter to what might be expected if fronto-parietal
areas are assumed to be continuously active for consciousness to
occur. It is also possible, however, that intact anatomical connec-
tions along with aminimal level of activity in fronto-parietal areas
may be sufficient to support consciousness. Further studies are
necessary to establish whether or not anatomical integrity and/or
functional activation of fronto-parietal areas are necessary or suf-
ficient for consciousness (Boly et al., 2011). An important role for
fronto-parietal networks in consciousness is, however, consistent
with evidence describing a range of metabolic activity patterns
during different tasks (and rest) since what may be important is
intact functional connectivity, not metabolic demand per se.
Slow wave activity. Electrophysiological recordings during both
general anesthesia and sleep suggest that slowwave activity (SWA)
may be a common mechanism related to LOC (Boly et al., 2009;
Murphy et al., 2011; Lewis et al., 2012). Although patterns of elec-
trophysiological activity in VS patients are more heterogeneous, a
recent study (Schnakers et al., 2008) using the “bispectral index”
(BIS, which, in low values, is highly weighted by the presence of
delta activity in the EEG) suggests that EEG slow frequency activ-
ity is higher in unresponsive patients in a vegetative state (VS)
than in minimally conscious state patients (MCS), presenting
non-reflexive behaviors (Figure 1) on average. To our knowledge,
the relationship between SWA and LOC during epileptic seizures
has not yet been investigated. At any rate, a mere criterion of
presence or absence of slow wave activity cannot be sufficient
to establish LOC in every case; indeed, during the tonic phase
of generalized tonico-clonic seizures, LOC is associated with a
high-frequency, low amplitude EEG (Blumenfeld et al., 2003;
Blumenfeld, 2005).
Effective connectivity and long-distance top-down connectiv-
ity. In instances of general anesthesia, sleep, and vegetative state,
TMS-EEG studies (Massimini et al., 2005; Rosanova et al., 2012;
Casali et al., 2013) suggest that a common mechanism could also
be the loss of effective connectivity, possibly induced by the pres-
ence of all-or-none bi-stable neuronal firing dynamics (Tononi
and Massimini, 2008). During seizures, hypersynchronous activ-
ity might also impair the functional differentiation of specialized
cortical areas. Finally, some impairment of functional integrity of
top-down (from the anterior to the posterior part of the brain)
connections has been suggested during general anesthesia and VS
(e.g., Boly et al., 2011, 2012a). Changes in top-down connectivity
during seizures and sleep still remain to be tested. We review the
relevant evidence in more details in the following sections.
CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN HUMANS
Definitions and measures for contents of consciousness
Studies of neural correlates of consciousness in HAVs often tar-
get neural correlates of conscious contents, while the level of
consciousness is assumed to be constant. Classically, measures
of conscious perception in awake humans distinguish objective
performance, such as the ability to discriminate the presence,
absence, or identity of distinct stimuli, from subjective reports,
such as subjective ratings of the visibility of stimuli or confidence
ratings of the accuracy of perceptual decisions, which are asso-
ciated with conscious perception. Studies taking this approach
have benefited from the application of “signal detection the-
ory” (SDT), which provides robust methods for distinguishing
objective performance from subjective performance (Maniscalco
and Lau, 2012; Barrett et al., 2013), independently of response
biases. While subjective ratings are typically obtained by asking
subjects to rate their confidence in their responses, several alterna-
tives exist [e.g., post-decision wagering, etc. see Seth et al. (2008)
for a review]. Currently there is no consensus about a single
best approach, and different measures show empirical as well as
theoretical divergence (Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012).
Importantly, a range of studies have outlined dissociations
between objective performance and subjective reports, for exam-
ple in so-called “blindsight” patients [who after lesions of pri-
mary visual cortex, lose consciously reportable vision (Persaud
et al., 2011)] and in normal subjects (Lau and Passingham,
2006; Sandberg et al., 2011). As such, a prominent experimen-
tal strategy when analyzing NCCs of conscious contents is to
dissociate objective from subjective responses while measuring
neural signals. A selection of the most relevant studies taking
this approach is summarized below. Future studies extending
this approach as well to patients face a number of important
challenges. These include distinguishing between the neuronal
correlates of conscious contents per se and the neural prerequi-
sites for, and consequences of, conscious states (Aru et al., 2012;
de Graaf et al., 2012), as well as (to the extent that they differ) the
neural underpinnings of conscious access from those underlying
phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2005; Lamme, 2010; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011)—though we acknowledge that the latter
distinction remains controversial and much debated (Kouider
et al., 2012).
Neuroimaging studies of the neural correlates of consciousness of
conscious contents
Over the last decades, many studies have investigated NCCs
of conscious contents in HAVs. A common paradigm is
to employ functional neuroimaging experiments contrasting
brain responses to intensity-matched perceived and unperceived
stimuli.
Functional MRI studies typically reveal poor correlation
between conscious contents and activity in primary sensory corti-
cal areas (for review see Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). However,
the evidence remains mixed. For example, in a bistable percep-
tion paradigm (where for the same stimulus, perception alternates
between two conscious scenes), activity in primary visual cortex
(V1) and lateral geniculate nuclei (LGN) was found to corre-
late well with conscious perception (Tong, 2003; Haynes and
Rees, 2005; Wunderlich et al., 2005). Ongoing discussions con-
cern whether these effects are partially or entirely (Watanabe et al.,
2011) confounded by the effects of attention (Boynton, 2011;
Watanabe et al., 2011) (Figure 4). It is also possible that BOLD
signals measured with fMRI may not reflect the underlying spik-
ing activities in the measured area (Maier et al., 2008) (see NCC
studies in non-human primates).
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FIGURE 4 | (A) A 2-by-2 factorial design for independent manipulation of
top-down attention and conscious visibility of the stimulus (Watanabe et al.,
2011). Subjects are asked to carry out one of two attention tasks while
viewing either a visible or invisible target stimulus. At the same time,
dependent variables, such as hemodynamic responses in the brain, are
measured. Here, we illustrate roughly what participants perceived in each
condition (not the physical stimulus) in the study by Watanabe and colleagues.
Subjects either had to report the presence of a target letter when it appeared
or whether they could see the target grating or not. (B) fMRI responses in V1
is strongly modulated by top-down attention but not by conscious visibility of
the grating. Modified based on Figures 2, S2 (n = 7 in total) in (Watanabe
et al., 2011). The data was provided by the original author. The area under the
curve (7–18 s from the block onset) is normalized to the attended and visible
condition. The error bar represents 95% confidence interval.
More generally, consciousness-related activations are fre-
quently found in higher-order sensory areas (e.g., Tong et al.,
1998; Grill-Spector et al., 2000) and in bilateral parietal and pre-
frontal cortical areas (Dehaene et al., 2001; Lau and Passingham,
2006; Boly et al., 2007a; Farrer et al., 2008; Desmurget and Sirigu,
2009; Sadaghiani et al., 2009; Bor and Seth, 2012; but also see Tse
et al., 2005; Tallon-Baudry, 2011).
Event-related potentials (ERPs) and magneto-
encephalography (MEG) studies point to long-latency ERP
components, possibly involving fronto-parietal areas, as a reliable
neuronal marker for conscious perception in healthy controls
(Del Cul et al., 2007; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). Indeed,
several studies showed preserved early latency scalp-ERP activity
during processing of non-conscious sensory stimuli (Vogel et al.,
1998; Sergent et al., 2005). Perhaps the most consistent findings
from EEG/MEG studies of the content-related NCCs consist
in late (300–500ms) activity, often represented by a positive
component called P3b (van Aalderen-Smeets et al., 2006; Del
Cul et al., 2007; Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2008; Bekinschtein
et al., 2009; Koivisto et al., 2009). The generators of the P3b
ERP have been suggested to involve temporal, parietal, and
frontal association areas (Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Mantini et al.,
2009).
Conscious perception is also accompanied by increases in
power and synchrony in the gamma band (>30Hz) (Schurger
et al., 2006; Melloni et al., 2007; Doesburg et al., 2009;
Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009). A small number of stud-
ies have, however, also found fronto-parietal activation and
gamma activity during unconscious processing of sensory stim-
uli (Diaz and McCarthy, 2007; Luo et al., 2009). In the
alpha and low beta bands (10–20Hz), long-distance phase
synchrony shows consistent changes for consciousness-related
activity (Gross et al., 2004; Gaillard et al., 2009; Hipp et al.,
2011).
Dissociation of conscious perception and high-level cognitive
processing
Another highlight of consciousness research during the last 10
years has been the accumulation of evidence for a dissociation
between consciousness and many high-level cognitive functions
(reviewed in Boly and Seth, 2012; van Gaal and Lamme, 2012).
In particular, the development of the continuous flash suppres-
sion paradigm (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya et al., 2006),
together with traditional backward and meta-contrast masking
(Kouider and Dehaene, 2007), has generated considerable new
evidence extending the limits of non-conscious processing in
the healthy awake human brain. Presently, a number of stud-
ies suggest that conscious perception may not be necessary for
the operation of various complex cognitive processes, such as
attention (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007), cognitive control (van Gaal
et al., 2011), conflict monitoring (van Gaal et al., 2010), volition
(Soon et al., 2008), arithmetic (Sklar et al., 2012), or feature bind-
ing (Mudrik et al., 2011), and semantic analysis (Kouider and
Dehaene, 2007; but also see Kang et al., 2011).
As alluded in the last part of section Altered Levels of
Consciousness in Humans, these findings also have relevance for
probing the level of consciousness in neurological patients, in a
sense that probing one particular cognitive function (e.g., atten-
tion or volitional responses) in a patient may not be sufficient to
assure that the patient has a high level of consciousness (Boly and
Seth, 2012). It is important to remember, however, that the effect
size of these complex cognitive processes in the absence of con-
sciousness is typically much smaller, compared to that obtained
in the presence of consciousness (van Gaal and Lamme, 2012).
Partial awareness
Another important concept that has attracted attention in recent
years is that of “partial awareness” (Kouider and Dupoux, 2004;
Kouider et al., 2010). The gradual vs. “all-or-none” nature of
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consciousness has remained controversial (Sergent and Dehaene,
2004; Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, 2005). But, recent refine-
ments in the subjective assessments of conscious perception have
led to the recognition of a “gray zone,” in which subjects report
that they perceived a stimulus, without always being completely
aware of its details, in the sense of being able to provide accu-
rate reports regarding these details (see e.g., Overgaard et al.,
2006). Studies using visual crowding have also indicated differ-
ent levels of subjective visibility of a detectable object (Kouider
and Dupoux, 2004; Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, 2005; Pelli
and Tillman, 2008; Kouider et al., 2010). Interestingly, crowd-
ing phenomena have been well-approximated and to some extent
explained by computer vision algorithms that incorporate “sta-
tistical perception” in peripheral vision (Freeman and Simoncelli,
2011; Rosenholtz et al., 2012). Partial awareness is associated with
intermediate performance levels as compared to no perception or
full perception scores (Sandberg et al., 2011). Furthermore, while
studies in HAVs typically emphasize fronto-parietal activity for
full conscious access to stimuli (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011),
two recent studies using continuous flash suppression have found
that brain activation related to partial awareness was more evi-
dent in associative visual cortical areas (Hesselmann and Malach,
2011; Hesselmann et al., 2011).
Spontaneous brain activity and conscious perception
An emerging topic in consciousness research is the influence
of spontaneous brain activity fluctuations on the perception of
external stimuli (Boly et al., 2008b; Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson
et al., 2009). For example, the activity in the lateral fronto-
parietal areas and default-mode network seems to have facilitating
and suppressive effects, respectively, on conscious perception of
somatosensory stimuli (Boly et al., 2007a). For the auditory
modality, however, high activity in the lateral fronto-parietal cor-
tical areas seems to have a suppressive effect, while high activity
in the default-mode network seems facilitating (Sadaghiani et al.,
2009). In a separate line of research, fMRI studies of human sub-
jects under the influence of psylocibin (a psychedelic compound)
showed reduced functional connectivity between prefrontal and
cingulate cortical areas in task-free conditions (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2012). While research on the link between spontaneous
brain activity fluctuations and conscious perception is ongoing
(Sadaghiani et al., 2010), multiple studies have now demonstrated
that amplitude and phase of ongoing neural oscillations at which
a visual stimulus is presented, influences evoked cortical acti-
vation patterns and perceptual performance (Mathewson et al.,
2009; Vanrullen et al., 2011; Chakravarthi and Vanrullen, 2012).
These and other studies stress the dynamic character of the brain’s
responsiveness to sensory stimulation.
ANIMAL STUDIES
Animal models of consciousness
Consciousness research using non-human animals can be divided
into two categories. The first category assumes the presence of
consciousness in a particular animal species, such as non-human
primates, and uses them as a model for human consciousness.
The second category attempts to establish whether a particu-
lar animal species has conscious experiences or not, in order to
understand the phylogenetic origins and comparative physiologi-
cal basis of consciousness (Edelman and Seth, 2009; Feinberg and
Mallatt, 2013; Mashour and Alkire, 2013).
NCC studies in non-human primates
Old world monkeys such as rhesus macaques have many similar-
ities in psychophysical performance with humans (Smith et al.,
2009; Lynn and Curran, 2010). At the same time, anatomical and
functional organization of their brains share many similarities
with that of human brains (Orban et al., 2004; Vincent et al.,
2007). Therefore, they are frequently used as models for con-
sciousness in humans. Some animal studies of NCCs of altered
conscious level (e.g., during general anesthesia or sleep) have
already been briefly discussed above. Thus, this section will focus
on animal studies of the neural correlates of conscious contents.
Since vision is a dominant sensory modality for both humans
and non-human primates, many studies have focused on eluci-
dating the neural substrates of normal and impaired conscious
visual perception. Specifically, monkeys have been used to investi-
gate the NCCs of conscious content on the level of single neurons
and their populations, since the requisite intracranial micro-
electrode recordings can only be performed in humans under
exceptional circumstances, for example to localize seizure foci
in epileptic patients (Kreiman et al., 2002; Mukamel and Fried,
2012). In addition, recent years have seen an increase of studies
that combine local, reversible lesions in monkeys with neu-
roimaging methods in order to further our understanding of the
causal contribution of certain brain structures to consciousness,
as well as study network impairments underlying visual aware-
ness disorders such as blindsight (Yoshida et al., 2008; Schmid
et al., 2010; Leopold, 2012), spatial neglect (Wardak et al., 2002a;
Gerits et al., 2012; Wilke et al., 2012), and even confidence in
visual perception (Komura et al., 2013).
In parallel work involving human subjects, a particularly fruit-
ful approach has employed “multistable visual stimuli,” where the
same physical stimulus can give rise to multiple conscious inter-
pretations (Leopold and Logothetis, 1999). Familiar examples
of methodologies employing such stimuli include the Necker-
Cube, Binocular Rivalry or Flash Suppression paradigms (Blake
and Logothetis, 2002; Wilke et al., 2003; Kim and Blake, 2005;
Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005) (Figure 5). Electrophysiological studies
in monkeys employing such paradigms have revealed that neu-
ronal spiking in a wide range of cortical areas is correlated with
subjective perception, including retinotopically organized visual
areas (Logothetis and Schall, 1989; Leopold and Logothetis, 1996;
Bradley et al., 1998; Wilke et al., 2006), inferotemporal (IT) cor-
tex (Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997; Kreiman et al., 2002), medial
temporal lobe (Kreiman et al., 2002) and fronto-parietal areas
(Williams et al., 2003; Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012). From a
multitude of studies, a view has emerged that the proportion
of neurons that reflect conscious perception gradually increases
from early stages of visual processing (i.e. V1/V2) toward “higher-
order” association areas (i.e., V4/IT) (Figure 6). Correspondingly,
the few studies that have investigated spiking activity in thalamic
visual nuclei have reported perceptual modulation in “second-
order” (i.e., pulvinar), but not in first-order, thalamic nuclei
[e.g., lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN)] (Lehky and Maunsell,
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FIGURE 5 | Examples for bistable stimuli used to investigate the neurophysiological correlates of conscious perception in monkeys.
FIGURE 6 | Neurophysiological correlates of visual awareness measured
in different studies by intracranial recordings in monkeys and humans.
Color code depicts the reported percentage of sites modulated for a given
signal: Single Unit/Multiunit (upper row), Local Field Potentials (LFP) (lower row)
Gamma band (40–100Hz), Alpha/Beta (8–30Hz). Stimulus paradigms used in
the depicted studies are in brackets next to the area label (see Figure 5).
Unavailable information for a given area is given as white circle. Data were
derived from following publications: V1-V4 (Leopold and Logothetis, 1996; Gail
et al., 2004; Wilke et al., 2006; Maier et al., 2008; Keliris et al., 2010), LGN
(Lehky and Maunsell, 1996; Wilke et al., 2009), STS/IT (Sheinberg and
Logothetis, 1997; Kreiman et al., 2002), MT/MST (Logothetis and Schall, 1989;
Williams et al., 2003; Maier et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2009), LIP (Williams et al.,
2003), pulvinar (Wilke et al., 2009), FEF (Libedinsky and Livingstone, 2011), and
LPFC (Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012). Abbreviations: BR, Binocular Rivalry;
BRFS, Binocular Rivalry Flash Suppression; GFS, Generalized Flash
Suppression; SfM, Structure-from-Motion; AM, Apparent Motion Quartet.
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1996; Wilke et al., 2009). Interestingly, a recent study found that
pulvinar neurons signaled “confidence” during motion percep-
tion judgments in a random-dot-motion paradigm, suggesting
a further connection with subjective responses (Komura et al.,
2013).
Animal studies have been especially informative in showing
that putative NCCs of conscious content depend on the type of
neural signals recorded and the type of the stimuli used (Maier
et al., 2007, 2008). The most striking discrepancy has emerged in
respect to early stages of visual processing, notably LGN and area
V1, where neuronal firing rates did not reliably correlate with sub-
jective perception, but where the power and oscillations in lower
frequencies of local field potentials (LFP) and BOLD signals mea-
sured with fMRI apparently does reflect the perceptual state quite
reliably (Lehky and Maunsell, 1996; Tong and Engel, 2001; Gail
et al., 2004; Wunderlich et al., 2005; Tong et al., 2006; Wilke et al.,
2006, 2009; Maier et al., 2008; Figure 6). Although we are still far
from understanding the exact role of the different signal types in
conscious states, there is now an appreciation of the complexity of
neural signals that correlate with consciousness, other than sim-
ply firing rates of individual neurons. Thus, investigations of the
coupling between electrophysiological parameters that give rise to
LFPs and BOLD signals will likely deepen our understanding of
the neural mechanisms underpinning consciousness (Logothetis,
2008; Sirotin and Das, 2009; Singh, 2012).
In sum, although neural correlates of conscious perception
have been identified in different signal types and areas of the
brain, we currently lack a comprehensive model that suggests
how and when distributed network components contribute to
visual consciousness. Moreover, in our opinion, we are still far
from a comprehensive understanding of which components are
prerequisites, substrates, or merely consequences of conscious
perception, and especially, how these components work together
to generate conscious percept (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al.,
2012). Future work in this line should therefore take advan-
tage of network connectivity analyses (Friston et al., 2013) and
perturbation methods (Massimini et al., 2009) as far as possi-
ble. Some promising work using pharmacological interventions
is described below.
Pharmacological intervention combined with neuroimaging with
non-human primate models
A promising path in monkey research is offered by the combi-
nation of pharmacological techniques with electrophysiological
and functional imaging methods. For example, by reversibly
perturbing neuronal activity by the local injection of various
pharmacological agents while monitoring neuronal activity, it has
become possible to evaluate the flow of information between con-
tributing brain areas and to elucidate the causal contribution of a
given area to conscious perception.
One productive application of this method has been in the
study of spatial neglect in monkeys (Wardak et al., 2002b; Hwang
et al., 2012; Wilke et al., 2012). Spatial neglect is one of the most
common disorders of visual awareness (or attention) in humans,
and it is characterized by impaired or lost awareness and explo-
ration of the visual space contralateral to the lesion (Kerkhoff,
2001).
Although the advent of structural and functional MRI has
identified parietal cortex, superior temporal sulcus, and poste-
rior thalamus as critical network components in neglect patients
(Karnath et al., 2001, 2002; Mort et al., 2003), even the most
recent neglect models describe the networks at very gross
functional levels, representing patterns of activation in whole
sulci and gyri as single components of the model (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2011). This lack of anatomical and functional detail is
mainly due to the fact that a systematic dissection of implicated
network components often proves difficult in human patient pop-
ulations due to great variations in size and location of the lesions
and the effects of reorganizational processes that often occur soon
after lesion onset. Therefore, reversible lesions using pharmaco-
logical methods in animal models are indispensable for testing
specific hypotheses. For example, the intraparietal sulcus (IPS)
serves a central role in most current neglect models (Corbetta
et al., 2005; Vossel et al., 2010). However, we know from mon-
key electrophysiological (Andersen and Gnadt, 1989; Cui and
Andersen, 2007) and human fMRI studies (Grefkes and Fink,
2005) that the IPS contains a number of areas that are special-
ized for different modalities and effectors such as eye and hand.
From recent reversible inactivation studies in monkeys we have
now learned that lesions in different parts of the parietal cor-
tex indeed evoke effector-specific spatial neglect-like symptoms
(Wardak et al., 2002b; Hwang et al., 2012; Wilke et al., 2012).
However, more research in animal models is required in order
to develop a strictly neurobiological neglect model based on the
properties of neuronal populations, rather than those of whole
brain areas (Corbetta and Shulman, 2011). In addition, future
researchmust necessarily focus on discriminating between lesion-
induced changes in conscious access and changes in attention
to move. This will require the development of more elaborate
behavioral testing procedures, such as in (Komura et al., 2013).
Phylogenetic origins of consciousness
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the phyloge-
netic origins of consciousness (Edelman and Seth, 2009; Feinberg
and Mallatt, 2013). Accumulating evidence indicates the presence
of complex cognitive processes in animals, such as birds and cer-
tain invertebrates that are phylogenetically distant from humans.
Examples include the presence of working memory, social learn-
ing, planning, and problem solving in birds (Pepperberg, 2006;
Salwiczek et al., 2010), as well as the presence of rich behaviors,
sophisticated learning and memory faculties in cephalopod mol-
lusks such as the octopus (Edelman and Seth, 2009). Complex
cognition may also correlates with the level of consciousness
that can be achieved by an organism (e.g., Butler, 2012). Note
that this is not contradictory with our previous statement that
conscious perception may not be necessary for the operation of
various complex cognitive processes. Even if complex cognitive
processes and consciousness can be dissociated, the presence of
a more complex brain, with stronger hierarchical connectivity,
likely correlates with both the presence of more complex cognitive
processes, and with potentially higher levels of consciousness.
While animal studies in lower vertebrates may facilitate our
understanding of the phylogenetic origins of consciousness, stud-
ies of consciousness in such distant non-mammalian phyla raise
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the issue of distinguishing the study of primary consciousness or
conscious access (in the absence of report) from that of higher
order consciousness (Edelman et al., 2005). Nevertheless, in order
to fruitfully pursue investigations of possible conscious states in
non-human animals, it is useful to take data from humans as a
benchmark and reference, comparing neuroanatomical, neuro-
physiological, and behavioral properties observed in non-human
animals to the human case (Seth et al., 2005).
We return to future directions in this area in the section enti-
tled, “Beyond humans and non-human primates: General issues
in animal studies.”
THEORIES
The increasing flow of experimental results concerning neural
correlates of conscious level and conscious content in various
conditions underscores the need for deep theoretical accounts to
confront and hopefully integrate such a “data deluge.” Integrating
theories with experiments is crucial for identifying the mech-
anisms that are consistently observed in association with the
presence or absence of conscious contents under various levels
of consciousness. Only a combination of theory and experiment
can accommodate and unify the large number of results accu-
mulated in the field within a common explanatory framework.
We will now review some recent influential neuroscientific theo-
retical developments that attempt to link neuronal activity with
conscious perception.
Block (2009) has suggested dividing current theoretical frame-
works of consciousness into three categories: biological theories,
higher-order thought theories, and global workspace/information
integration theories. Biological theories posit that consciousness
corresponds to particular biological states or processes of the
brain. Candidates for such states include gamma frequency activ-
ity (Llinas et al., 1998), recurrent, or “reentrant,” processing
(Edelman, 1989; Lamme, 2006), and long-distance synchrony
(Melloni et al., 2007). However, to date, no consensus has been
reached concerning which brain states or processes should be
considered as reliable signatures of conscious processing.
According to the higher-order thought (HOT) theory
(Rosenthal, 2000, 2005), a conscious experience of “red” con-
sists of a first-order neural representation (for example, in the
visual system) accompanied by a thought or higher-order cogni-
tive state (possibly originating in frontal cortical areas) directed
at that representation of “red,” with the content being the sub-
ject’s experience. According to the HOT theory, consciousness
implies access and rules out non-reportable conscious contents by
theoretical fiat.
Global workspace theory (GWT) was introduced by Baars
(1988) and can be viewed as a “theatre” or “arena” metaphor
for mental functioning (Baars and Laureys, 2005). According
to Baars et al. (2003), once conscious sensory content is estab-
lished, it is distributed (broadcasted) widely to a decentralized
“audience” of expert networks, including contextual and execu-
tive interpreters in parietal and prefrontal cortical areas [also see
a recent thoroughly updated account in (Baars et al., 2012)]. In
terms of empirical data relevant to conscious content, GWT pre-
dicts that conscious perception should mobilize widespread brain
resources, while unconscious sensory processing should be much
more localized (Baars, 2005). Other proposed properties of con-
scious perception are; (1) informativeness—that is, widespread
adaptation to the novelty of the reportable signal; (2) internal
consistency of conscious contents—because mutually exclusive
global broadcasts tend to degrade each other (e.g., binocular
rivalry); (3) interaction with an implicit self system (Baars and
Laureys, 2005); and (4) limited capacity, and an operating cycle
of 100–200ms [see updated framework in Baars et al. (2012)].
Two research programs have pursued GWT in detail. A French
group led by Dehaene and Changeux has focused on formal
models of specific experimental paradigms that allow close com-
parisons between conscious and unconscious conditions. These
paradigms have pinpointed the importance of widespread fronto-
parietal areas activation for conscious perception, in line with
the GWT notion of broadcasting (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Dehaene and Changeux, 2004, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2006; see also
Shanahan, 2008). Franklin and his colleagues have pursued GWT
in the context of a large-scale computer model of cognitive archi-
tecture and its links with working memory and attention (Baars
and Franklin, 2003, 2007; Franklin et al., 2012). A recent study
also showed evidence for the appearance of broadcasting with
brain maturation (and presumably higher level of consciousness)
in young infants (Kouider et al., 2013). However, precise empir-
ical and mechanistic accounts of the concept of “broadcast” in
the generation of conscious experience—a crucial component of
GWT—are still lacking.
The information integration theory of consciousness (IITC;
Tononi, 2008) has the global aim of explaining links between
neuronal activity and the emergence of any conscious content.
This theory emphasizes the dynamical complexity of conscious
scenes, namely the view that conscious scenes are simultaneously
integrated (i.e., united in a single percept) and differentiated (i.e.,
each experience rules out a vast repertoire of alternative possi-
bilities). It predicts that a given level of consciousness will be
correlated with coexisting states of differentiation and integration
(Massimini et al., 2009). Recent TMS-EEG studies (Massimini
et al., 2005; Ferrarelli et al., 2010; Rosanova et al., 2012; Casali
et al., 2013) have indeed suggested that consciousness should
necessarily require both, neuronal activity integration and dif-
ferentiation. A distinguishing feature of the IITC is its attempt
to explicitly link basic properties of phenomenology to neural
dynamics. A challenge for the theory is precise predictions con-
cerning which spatio-temporal scale and particular brain struc-
tures that support conscious experience have not yet been offered
(Boly et al., 2009). However, several approximations of measures
of information integration, accounting for these properties, are
now available (Barrett and Seth, 2011; Chang et al., 2012). Related
measures such as “causal density” capture a similar balance of
integration and differentiation, but under a different set ofmathe-
matical assumptions, in this case emphasizing causal interactions
among system elements (Seth et al., 2011a).
In the last few years, the concept of predictive coding has
gained accelerating influence in the neuroscience community
(Friston, 2010; Bastos et al., 2012). According to this framework,
perception involves the formation of a “generative model” of
sensory causes via hierarchical Bayesian inference, implying that
many observable brain responses should be proportional to the
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mismatch between actual and predicted signals at every level of
processing, i.e., to prediction errors. To date, a number of stud-
ies seem to support this hypothesis (for a review see Clark, 2013).
Nevertheless, forging theoretical links between predictive coding
and consciousness remains very much an open issue (Hohwy,
2012). Indeed, predictive processing could characterize both con-
scious and unconscious processes. For example, subjects seem
to respond in a Bayesian optimal manner, even in the case of
inferences concerning unconsciously processed stimuli (de Lange
et al., 2011). Furthermore, predictive coding has been suggested
to take place even at the level of motor reflexes in the spinal cord
through the fulfillment of proprioceptive predictions (Friston,
2012). On the other hand, predictive coding has also been invoked
to account for the subjective feelings of agency (Friston, 2012)
and, in a separate line, for both subjective feeling states (emo-
tions) (Seth and Critchley, 2013), and the sense of subjective
reality of the world and the self (i.e., “presence”) (Seth et al.,
2011b; Critchley and Seth, 2012). Future conceptual and exper-
imental work must be directed toward understanding the links
between Bayesian brain inference and conscious perception.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES
Despite the substantial advances summarized above, no consen-
sus has yet been reached on the nature or location(s) of the
NCC or NCCs, for either conscious content or conscious level.
As mentioned previously, not only is this is a necessary step
in realizing the basic science of consciousness, but such a con-
sensus carries important clinical implications for the design of
consciousness markers applicable to conditions like the vegetative
state or general anesthesia.
Human consciousness
Research on altered states of consciousness would greatly benefit
from the acquisition of data using highly conserved paradigms
and neuroimaging modalities in different states such as coma,
general anesthesia, sleep, seizures, and somnambulism (sleep-
walking, or NREM sleep parasomnia). A deeper understanding
of the neural correlates of the LOC during sleep or general anes-
thesia is also urgently required, as well as relations between neural
processes and altered conscious states evoked by pharmacological
manipulations [e.g., psylocibin; (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012)].
Most studies investigating neural correlates in these states
merely compare brain functions under general anesthesia, sleep,
or vegetative state with those apparent in normal wakefulness.
However, these apparently straightforward comparisons may be
misleading. For example, it is now known that subjects awakening
from general anesthesia report a significant incidence of dreaming
[26%, (Mashour et al., 2011)]. Results from studies using the iso-
lated forearm technique (performing sedation without paralyzing
the forearm, allowing for a probing of response to command) also
report a median incidence of responsiveness of about 37% dur-
ing general anesthesia under perioperative conditions (Sanders
et al., 2012). To better understand these observations, stud-
ies comparing brain activity under general anesthesia with or
without dreaming, as well as with or without response to com-
mands, are crucial (Sanders et al., 2012). A better understanding
of differences in brain activity during sleep in the presence or
absence of dream report after awakening is also needed. In vegeta-
tive state patient populations, comparing brain activity in subjects
with or without a response in active volitional paradigms is crit-
ical (Owen, 2013). Finally, a more refined distinction between
neural correlates of unconsciousness (the absence of any con-
scious contents) vs. neural correlates of disconnectedness (the
absence of perception of the environment) during both sleep and
general anesthesia is essential (Sanders et al., 2012).
Current efforts also aim at validating clinical “consciousness-
meters” that would enable us to detect language-independent
(Majerus et al., 2005; Scott et al., 2011; Casali et al., 2013) min-
imal signs of awareness (of any content) in non-communicative
patients. If signs of consciousness are detected, then improve-
ments in brain-computer interface technology will permit some
of these “functionally locked-in” patients to express their
thoughts and wishes (for a review, see Chatelle et al., 2012).
Advances in hardware, software, and statistical signal analysis and
modeling of brain recordings from portable EEG or functional
near-infrared spectroscopy devices will be needed to achieve an
acceptable accuracy in these technologies at the single subject
level. Avoiding both false negative (i.e., failing to detect signs
of consciousness or communication in aware subjects) and false
positive results (i.e., detecting consciousness or communication
when there is none) is especially challenging in the absence of a
gold standard for conscious awareness (Laureys and Boly, 2008).
In addition, new prognostic tests continue to improve our capac-
ity to predict the probability of recovery of consciousness (Jox
et al., 2012). Again, these tools will need to show their clinical
value at the single patient level.
Scientifically, the cellular mechanisms which underlie the
functional recovery of awareness after severe traumatic or anoxic
brain injury remain obscure; axonal sprouting, neurite out-
growth, neurogenesis (known to occur predominantly in asso-
ciative cortical areas in non-human primates), or even apoptosis
are being tested as candidate processes (Laureys et al., 2006).
The challenge still remains to identify the conditions in which,
and the mechanisms by which, some patients with disorders of
consciousness may recover.
Regarding consciousness research in healthy awake humans,
further research must be undertaken to uncover the precise disso-
ciations observed between consciousness and cognitive functions
such as attention, cognitive control, and volition, either taken
alone or in association with one another (Boly and Seth, 2012).
These functions need to be carefully and independently manipu-
lated from conscious contents to isolate the neuronal correlates
of consciousness without contamination of dissociable cogni-
tive functions (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel et al., 2010;
Watanabe et al., 2011; Bor and Seth, 2012).
The functional advantages of conscious over non-conscious
perception remain to be elucidated. In this regard, paradigms dis-
sociating the effects of conscious perception from those of better
behavioral performance are critical (Lau and Passingham, 2006;
Persaud et al., 2011). The question of conscious and unconscious
is not limited in perception; it remains unclear to what extent
our actions are triggered by conscious freewill and preceded by
unconscious processes (Soon et al., 2008).
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Issues in non-human primate studies
What have we learned from non-human primate studies about
the neural mechanisms of visual conscious perception within the
past half-century and what remains to be investigated? Amazingly
enough, the fundamental question of whether activity in the
early visual cortex is a part of the neural substrate of a con-
scious percept, or merely an enabling factor, has not yet been
answered (Crick and Koch, 1995). Are loops between visual and
fronto-parietal areas necessary to enable a conscious percept,
and do second-order thalamic nuclei such as the pulvinar con-
tribute to consciousness by facilitating communication in those
cortical networks (Sherman and Guillery, 2002; Saalmann and
Kastner, 2011)? Several laboratories have now begun to investi-
gate these questions by combining brain inactivation/stimulation
with electrophysiological and functional imaging methods.
Another vexing issue of equal importance is the nature of
the neural computations that underlie visual awareness. Simply
stated, does consciousness rely only on neuronal firing rates,
or on the precise timing of population activity (Fries et al.,
1997; Tallon-Baudry, 2003; Gail et al., 2004; Wilke et al., 2006;
Uhlhaas et al., 2011)? To tackle this issue experimentally, one
would wish for methods that allow the systematic manipu-
lation of neuronal timing while keeping firing rates constant
(Stopfer et al., 1997).
Another important question is whether specific cell types
(e.g., deep vs. superficial pyramidal cells, Von Economo neu-
rons, etc.) are more important for consciousness than others?
Do consciousness-related neurons have specific morphologies
and/or molecular properties, or is their connectivity the criti-
cal factor (but see Maier et al., 2007)? These questions can, in
theory, be tackled by means of newly emergent technologies,
such as optogenetics, that through genetic modification of ion
channels allow the manipulation of the electrical activity of
specific neuronal phenotypes by activating them with light
(Deisseroth, 2011; Yizhar et al., 2011). The targeted expression
of genetically encoded proteins, together with an appropriate
readout, has enormous potential to unravel the microcircuitry
(at micro-/millimetric scales) underlying conscious perception.
However, time will tell whether the light-mediated, optogenetic
control of neural activity—with its limited spatial coverage—
represents the best means of manipulating consciousness-related
activity in large primate brains (Diester et al., 2011; Gerits et al.,
2012; Nielsen et al., 2012).
Finally, in order to improve the credibility of non-human pri-
mate models of human consciousness, we need to deepen our
understanding of similarities and differences in the underlying
neural networks. This can be achieved by conducting more com-
parative studies that employ the same behavioral tasks and mea-
surement methods (e.g., fMRI) in both human and non-human
species (Kagan et al., 2010).
Beyond humans and non-human primates: general issues in animal
studies
The investigation of possible conscious states in animals presents
a number of daunting challenges, as well as some important
opportunities. Most significant among the challenges are: (1)
the assessment of consciousness in the absence of verbal report;
(2) the characterization of brain structures and neurophysiolog-
ical signatures—perhaps homologous to those already identified
in mammals and birds—that might support conscious states in
lower vertebrates (Karten, 2013); (3) the identification of neu-
roanatomical and neurophysiological properties that might sug-
gest at least the possibility of conscious states in invertebrates
with relatively large, differentiated, and centralized nervous sys-
tems (i.e., cephalopod mollusks, arachnids); and finally (4) the
development and application of more elaborate neuroimaging
and electrophysiological techniques applicable to a wide vari-
ety of small non-primate (and even aquatic and/or invertebrate)
species.
The absence of verbal report for the assessment of con-
sciousness in the majority of non-human phyla is not an insur-
mountable issue. As has been shown in a number of studies of
non-human primate models of blindsight and spatial neglect,
training regimes can be employed that require animals to give
a behavioral report of their putative experiences (Stoerig and
Cowey, 1995; Wilke et al., 2012). Such “metacognitive commen-
taries” provides a robust complement to neuroanatomical, elec-
trophysiological, and psychophysical techniques in the study of
NCC in non-human primates. In addition to subjective reports,
there are also statistical and objective criteria that are now fre-
quently employed to obtain behavioral correlates of conscious-
ness in animal studies (Leopold et al., 2003).
Similar neuronal mechanisms might support a level of con-
sciousness across mammalian species in general, given brain
structures and circuitry that are closely homologous to the human
case, conserved neurophysiological signatures during sleep states
and general anesthesia, and comparable behavior (Edelman et al.,
2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009). Beyond mammals, however, this
argument is more difficult to make, primarily owing to an incom-
plete understanding of the relevant neuroanatomy and neuro-
physiology. Nevertheless, with technical advances in microscopic
reconstruction and the use of neurogenetic markers, it is increas-
ingly clear that many elements of brain structures considered
critical for supporting conscious states in mammals (e.g., the six-
layered neocortex) are conserved more deeply in the vertebrate
lineage, most notably among birds (Reiner et al., 2005; Karten,
2013). As well, avian electrophysiological signatures have been
identified that are reminiscent of mammalian sleep (Rattenborg
et al., 2009). These advances, along with accumulating evidence
for sophisticated learning and memory faculties (most notably
among the corvids; see Emery and Clayton, 2004; Bugnyar and
Heinrich, 2006), suggest that the rigorous study of avian con-
sciousness represents a plausible near-future scenario. The same
applies as well to studies of lower vertebrates such as reptiles,
amphibians, and even fish, given rapidly advancing neurophysi-
ology and neuroanatomy in these species.
Investigating consciousness in invertebrate phyla is more chal-
lenging. We lack detailed connectivity maps in all but a few
invertebrates. Nevertheless, there are invertebrates—most notably
the cephalopod mollusks (e.g., octopus, cuttlefish, and squid)
and arachnids (e.g., jumping spiders)—that show rich behav-
ioral repertoires suggestive of high-order neural function [e.g.,
learning, memory, integration, and monitoring; see (Fiorito and
Scotto, 1992; Biederman and Davey, 1993; Edelman et al., 2005)].
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Whether this level of neural function includes conscious pro-
cesses remains very much an open question (but see Mather,
2008). In any case, such a question remains important in poten-
tially shedding substantial light on possible universal properties
of consciousness, as well as its evolutionary trajectory on Earth.
THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In order to consolidate the results of the many relevant exper-
iments that have been conducted within a single conceptual
framework, theories of consciousness must become more precise
and generate experimentally testable predictions. Accomplishing
this requires both additional conceptual work from theorists and
greater knowledge of brain architecture and neural computations
relevant to consciousness, in order to guide and constrain theory
development. In particular, it is unclear how differential com-
putations performed by different cortical layers, cell types (e.g.,
inhibitory vs. excitatory), various neuromodulators, and con-
nections (e.g., feedforward vs. feedback, driving vs. modulatory)
contribute to consciousness. The causal roles of cortex, thalamus,
and brainstem remain poorly understood in this context. These
and similar considerations underline the need to reconcile exist-
ing theories (especially those based on integrated information
and complexity) with specific and well grounded anatomical and
neurodynamical observations.
More global challenges for theoretical perspectives involve
elaborating the links between predictive processing and con-
scious perception (Hohwy, 2012), and unifying these accounts
with those based on integrated information and/or dynami-
cal complexity. Theoretical developments are also needed to
characterize the relations between phenomenal consciousness
and access conscious (to the extent that there is a difference),
and, in a related direction, to better our understanding how
metacognition and first-order conscious contents are associ-
ated. Here, a promising direction may involve the elaboration
of signal-detection theory frameworks to include top-down sig-
nal processing (Barrett et al., 2013). As this research develops
it will integrate with other areas not discussed in this paper,
notably the neural bases of intention, agency, and conscious self-
hood. Overall, theoretical developments will help move from
simple correlation between neural events and conscious level
and content, toward causal and explanatory accounts that show
how specific neural mechanisms give rise to specific aspects
or dimensions of conscious phenomenology (Seth, 2010). In
doing so, theoretical developments must also engage with the
importance of distinguishing NCCs per se from their prereq-
uisites and consequences (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al.,
2012).
METHODOLOGICAL ADVANCES
For the sake of empirical rigor, new theories must be accompa-
nied by simultaneous methodological advances. Recent biotech-
nological developments offer great promise in furnishing the
appropriate data. New technologies, such as large-scale electron
microscopy and brain slices histology (Chung et al., 2012, 2013)
and 2-photon microscopy of the cortex in behaving animals
(Prakash et al., 2012), combined with optogenetics (Deisseroth,
2011; Yizhar et al., 2011), light-sheet microscopy (Ahrens et al.,
2013), cortical micro-electrode recordings (Du et al., 2011), and
optical imaging studies (Harvey et al., 2012) will soon enable us
to better establish how the brain’s micro-scale anatomy is cou-
pled to functional properties and information processing in vivo.
Large-scale projects such as the one initiated at the Allen Institute
for Brain Research are likely to be decisive developments in this
realm (Callaway, 2011). The combination of micro-scale and
macro-scale brain anatomy with functional data using large-
scale computational models could shed important light on brain
dynamics and neural computation present in various brain states,
such as those during sleep, general anesthesia, or various cognitive
tasks.
Furthermore, the appearance of new techniques such as lam-
inar and columnar fMRI [enabled by recent progress in high
field scanner development and fast sampling pulse sequences,
(Feinberg et al., 2010; Zimmermann et al., 2011; Van Essen et al.,
2012; Chen et al., 2013)], coupled to high density intracranial
electrophysiology recordings (Viventi et al., 2011) should also
yield a considerable amount of information about brain processes
linked to conscious perception in animals and humans.
Significant advances have also been made in the genetic
manipulation of non-human species (Venken et al., 2011). In
the realm of primate research, great interest has recently been
generated by the use of a primate subspecies, the marmoset,
as a “biomedical supermodel” for genetic manipulation (Sasaki
et al., 2009). Marmosets have a very high rate of reproduc-
tion and a short maturation time, biological attributes that lend
themselves nicely to paradigms combining genetics and neuro-
physiology. These new world monkeys are capable of performing
various complex cognitive tasks that could conceivably be tested
in various paradigms analogous to those employed in human
experiments (Remington et al., 2012). As well, they present a
relatively flat and smooth cortex that is extremely amenable to
electrophysiological investigations.
Returning finally to the human case, the first complete genetic
mapping of a human brain has recently been made available
to the research community, carrying enormous promise for
a better understanding of genotypic vs. phenotypic interac-
tions in the brain (Hawrylycz et al., 2012). As burgeoning new
techniques and experimental opportunities continue to gener-
ate an ever-increasing flow of valuable data, the development
of robust theoretical and mechanistic accounts will be even
more crucial in crafting a coherent and plausible account of
the links among consciousness, genotype, phenotype, and brain
function.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Melanie Boly and Steven Laureys are respectively Honorary
Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Research Director at the
Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research. Anil K. Seth
is supported by EPSRC fellowship EP/G007543/1, by the Dr.
Mortimer and Theresa Sackler Foundation, and by EU project
CEEDS (FP7-ICT-2009-5; project number 258749). Naotsugu
Tsuchiya is supported by ARC Future Fellowship, ARC Discovery
Project, and JST PRESTO fellowship. Melanie Wilke is sup-
ported by the Herman-and Lilly Schilling Foundation and DFG
(WI 406/1-1).
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 625 | 13
Boly et al. Consciousness in humans and non-human animals
REFERENCES
Ahrens, M. B., Orger, M. B., Robson, D.
N., Li, J. M., and Keller, P. J. (2013).
Whole-brain functional imaging
at cellular resolution using light-
sheet microscopy. Nat. Methods
10, 413–420. doi: 10.1038/nmeth.
2434
Alkire, M. T., and Miller, J. (2005).
General anesthesia and the neu-
ral correlates of consciousness.
Prog. Brain Res. 150, 229–244. doi:
10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50017-7
Andersen, R. A., and Gnadt, J. W.
(1989). Posterior parietal cortex.
Rev. Oculomot. Res. 3, 315–335.
Arthuis, M., Valton, L., Regis, J.,
Chauvel, P., Wendling, F., Naccache,
L., et al. (2009). Impaired con-
sciousness during temporal lobe
seizures is related to increased
long-distance cortical-subcortical
synchronization. Brain 132(Pt 8),
2091–2101. doi: 10.1093/brain/
awp086
Aru, J., Bachmann, T., Singer,
W., and Melloni, L. (2012).
Distilling the neural corre-
lates of consciousness. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 36, 737–746. doi:
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.003
Avidan, M. S., Jacobsohn, E., Glick,
D., Burnside, B. A., Zhang, L.,
Villafranca, A., et al. (2011).
Prevention of intraoperative
awareness in a high-risk surgical
population. N. Engl. J. Med. 365,
591–600. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa11
00403
Baars, B., Franklin, S., and Ramsoy,
T. Z. (2012). Global workspace
dynamics: cortical “binding and
propagation” enables conscious
contents. Front. Conscious. Res.
4:200. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.
00200
Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory
of Consciousness. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Baars, B. J. (2005). Global workspace
theory of consciousness: toward
a cognitive neuroscience of
human experience. Prog.
Brain Res. 150, 45–53. doi:
10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50004-9
Baars, B. J., and Franklin, S. (2003).
How conscious experience
and working memory interact.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 166–172. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00056-1
Baars, B. J., and Franklin, S. (2007).
An architectural model of con-
scious and unconscious brain func-
tions: global workspace theory and
IDA. Neural Netw. 20, 955–961. doi:
10.1016/j.neunet.2007.09.013
Baars, B. J., and Laureys, S. (2005).
One, not two, neural correlates
of consciousness. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 9, 269. author reply: 70. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.008
Baars, B. J., Ramsoy, T. Z., and
Laureys, S. (2003). Brain, conscious
experience and the observing self.
Trends Neurosci. 26, 671–675. doi:
10.1016/j.tins.2003.09.015
Bardin, J. C., Fins, J. J., Katz, D. I.,
Hersh, J., Heier, L. A., Tabelow,
K., et al. (2011). Dissociations
between behavioural and functional
magnetic resonance imaging-based
evaluations of cognitive function
after brain injury. Brain 134(Pt
3), 769–782. doi: 10.1093/brain/
awr005
Barrett, A., Dienes, Z., and Seth, A.
K. (2013). Measures of metacog-
nition on signal-detection theo-
retic models. Psychol. Methods. doi:
10.1037/a0033268. [Epub ahead of
print].
Barrett, A. B., Murphy, M., Bruno,
M. A., Noirhomme, Q., Boly, M.,
Laureys, S., et al. (2012). Granger
causality analysis of steady-state
electroencephalographic signals
during propofol-induced anaes-
thesia. PLoS ONE 7:e29072. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0029072
Barrett, A. B., and Seth, A. K. (2011).
Practical measures of integrated
information for time-series data.
PLoS Comput. Biol. 7:e1001052. doi:
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001052
Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams,
R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P., and
Friston, K. J. (2012). Canonical
microcircuits for predictive cod-
ing. Neuron 76, 695–711. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038
Bekinschtein, T. A., Dehaene, S.,
Rohaut, B., Tadel, F., Cohen, L.,
and Naccache, L. (2009). Neural
signature of the conscious pro-
cessing of auditory regularities.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106,
1672–1677. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
0809667106
Biederman, G. B., and Davey, V. A.
(1993). Social learning in inverte-
brates. Science 259, 1627–1628. doi:
10.1126/science.259.5101.1627
Blake, R., and Logothetis, N. K.
(2002). Visual competition. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 3, 13–21. doi:
10.1038/nrn701
Block, N. (2005). Two neural
correlates of consciousness.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 46–52. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006
Block, N. (2009). “Comparing the
major theories of consciousness,”
in The Cognitive Neurosciences
4th Edn., ed M. S. Gazzaniga
(Cambridge, MA: MIT press), 11.
Blumenfeld, H. (2005). Consciousness
and epilepsy: why are patients
with absence seizures absent. Prog.
Brain Res. 150, 271–286. doi:
10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50020-7
Blumenfeld, H., McNally, K. A.,
Vanderhill, S. D., Paige, A. L.,
Chung, R., Davis, K., et al. (2004).
Positive and negative network cor-
relations in temporal lobe epilepsy.
Cereb. Cortex 14, 892–902. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhh048
Blumenfeld, H., Westerveld, M.,
Ostroff, R. B., Vanderhill, S.
D., Freeman, J., Necochea, A.,
et al. (2003). Selective frontal,
parietal, and temporal net-
works in generalized seizures.
Neuroimage 19, 1556–1566. doi:
10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00204-0
Boly, M. (2011). Measuring the
fading consciousness in the
human brain. Curr. Opin.
Neurol. 24, 394–400. doi:
10.1097/WCO.0b013e328347da94
Boly, M., Balteau, E., Schnakers,
C., Degueldre, C., Moonen, G.,
Luxen, A., et al. (2007a). Baseline
brain activity fluctuations pre-
dict somatosensory perception
in humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 104, 12187–12192. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0611404104
Boly, M., Coleman, M. R., Davis,
M. H., Hampshire, A., Bor, D.,
Moonen, G., et al. (2007b). When
thoughts become action: an fMRI
paradigm to study volitional brain
activity in non-communicative
brain injured patients. Neuroimage
36, 979–992. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2007.02.047
Boly, M., Faymonville, M. E., Peigneux,
P., Lambermont, B., Damas, P., Del
Fiore, G., et al. (2004). Auditory
processing in severely brain injured
patients: differences between the
minimally conscious state and
the persistent vegetative state.
Arch. Neurol. 61, 233–238. doi:
10.1001/archneur.61.2.233
Boly, M., Faymonville, M. E.,
Schnakers, C., Peigneux, P.,
Lambermont, B., Phillips, C.,
et al. (2008a). Perception of pain
in the minimally conscious state
with PET activation: an obser-
vational study. Lancet Neurol. 7,
1013–1020. doi: 10.1016/S1474-
4422(08)70219-9
Boly, M., Phillips, C., Balteau, E.,
Schnakers, C., Degueldre, C.,
Moonen, G., et al. (2008b).
Consciousness and cerebral base-
line activity fluctuations. Hum.
Brain Mapp. 29, 868–874. doi:
10.1002/hbm.20602
Boly, M., and Seth, A. K. (2012).
Modes and models in disorders
of consciousness science. Arch.
Ital. Biol. 150, 172–184. doi:
10.4449/aib.v150i2.1372
Boly, M., Garrido, M. I., Gosseries,
O., Bruno, M. A., Boveroux,
P., Schnakers, C., et al. (2011).
Preserved feedforward but
impaired top-down processes
in the vegetative state. Science 332,
858–862. doi: 10.1126/science.
1202043
Boly, M., Massimini, M., and Tononi,
G. (2009). Theoretical approaches
to the diagnosis of altered states
of consciousness. Prog. Brain Res.
177, 383–398. doi: 10.1016/S0079-
6123(09)17727-0
Boly, M., Moran, R., Murphy, M.,
Boveroux, P., Bruno, M. A.,
Noirhomme, Q., et al. (2012a).
Connectivity changes underly-
ing spectral EEG changes during
propofol-induced loss of conscious-
ness. J. Neurosci. 32, 7082–7090. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3769-11.2012
Boly, M., Perlbarg, V., Marrelec, G.,
Schabus, M., Laureys, S., Doyon,
J., et al. (2012b). Hierarchical
clustering of brain activity during
human nonrapid eye move-
ment sleep. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 109, 5856–5861. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1111133109
Bor, D., and Seth, A. K. (2012).
Consciousness and the prefrontal
parietal network: insights from
attention, working memory, and
chunking. Front. Psychol. 3:63. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00063
Boveroux, P., Vanhaudenhuyse, A.,
Bruno, M. A., Noirhomme, Q.,
Lauwick, S., Luxen, A., et al.
(2010). Breakdown of within- and
between-network resting state func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging
connectivity during propofol-
induced loss of consciousness.
Anesthesiology 113, 1038–1053. doi:
10.1097/ALN.0b013e3181f697f5
Boynton, G. M. (2011). Spikes, BOLD,
attention, and awareness: a com-
parison of electrophysiological and
fMRI signals in V1. J. Vis. 11, 12.
doi: 10.1167/11.5.12
Bradley, D. C., Chang, G. C., and
Andersen, R. A. (1998). Encoding of
three-dimensional structure-from-
motion by primate area MT neu-
rons. Nature 392, 714–717. doi:
10.1038/33688
Bruno, M. A., Majerus, S., Boly, M.,
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Schnakers,
C., Gosseries, O., et al. (2012).
Functional neuroanatomy underly-
ing the clinical subcategorization of
minimally conscious state patients.
J. Neurol. 259, 1087–1098. doi:
10.1007/s00415-011-6303-7
Buckner, R. L., Sepulcre, J., Talukdar, T.,
Krienen, F. M., Liu, H., Hedden, T.,
et al. (2009). Cortical hubs revealed
by intrinsic functional connectivity:
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 625 | 14
Boly et al. Consciousness in humans and non-human animals
mapping, assessment of stability,
and relation to Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. J. Neurosci. 29, 1860–1873. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5062-08.2009
Bugnyar, T., and Heinrich, B. (2006).
Pilfering ravens, Corvus corax,
adjust their behaviour to social
context and identity of competi-
tors. Anim. Cogn. 9, 369–376. doi:
10.1007/s10071-006-0035-6
Busch, N. A., Dubois, J., and
VanRullen, R. (2009). The
phase of ongoing EEG oscilla-
tions predicts visual perception.
J. Neurosci. 29, 7869–7876. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0113-09.2009
Butler, A. (2012). “Hallmarks of con-
sciousness,” in Sensing in Nature, ed
C. López-Larrea, (New York, NY:
Springer), 291–309.
Callaway, E. (2011). Allen Institute aims
to crack neural code.Nat. News. doi:
10.1038/news.2011.190
Carhart-Harris, R. L., Erritzoe, D.,
Williams, T., Stone, J. M., Reed,
L. J., Colasanti, A., et al. (2012).
Neural correlates of the psychedelic
state as determined by fMRI stud-
ies with psilocybin. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 109, 2138–2143. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1119598109
Casali, A. G., Gosseries, O., Rosanova,
M., Boly, M., Sarasso, S., Casali,
K. R., et al. (2013). A theoreti-
cally based index of consciousness
independent of sensory pro-
cessing and behavior. Sci. Transl
Med. 5:198ra105. doi: 10.1126/
scitranslmed.3006294
Chakravarthi, R., and Vanrullen, R.
(2012). Conscious updating is a
rhythmic process. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 109, 10599–10604. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1121622109
Chang, J. Y., Pigorini, A., Massimini,
M., Tononi, G., Nobili, L., and Van
Veen, B. D. (2012). Multivariate
autoregressive models with exoge-
nous inputs for intracerebral
responses to direct electrical
stimulation of the human brain.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:317. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2012.00317
Chatelle, C., Chennu, S., Noirhomme,
Q., Cruse, D., Owen, A. M., and
Laureys, S. (2012). Brain-computer
interfacing in disorders of con-
sciousness. Brain Inj. 26, 1510–1522.
doi: 10.3109/02699052.2012.698362
Chen, G., Wang, F., Gore, J. C., and
Roe, A. W. (2013). Layer-specific
BOLD activation in awake mon-
key V1 revealed by ultra-high
spatial resolution functional
magnetic resonance imaging.
Neuroimage 64, 147–155. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.08.060
Chung, K., Kim, S., Zalocusky, K.
A., Mattis, J. H., Gradinaru, V.,
Kalyanasundaram, S., et al. (2012).
Clarity: technology for rapid, whole,
intact-brain imaging with molec-
ular phenotyping. Neuroscience.
(Abstract).
Chung, K., Wallace, J., Kim, S. Y.,
Kalyanasundaram, S., Andalman, A.
S., Davidson, T. J., et al. (2013).
Structural and molecular interro-
gation of intact biological sys-
tems. Nature 497, 332–337. doi:
10.1038/nature12107
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next.
Predictive brains, situated agents,
and the future of cognitive science.
Behav. Brain Sci. 36, 181–204. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X12000477
Corbetta, M., Kincade, M. J., Lewis, C.,
Snyder, A. Z., and Sapir, A. (2005).
Neural basis and recovery of spatial
attention deficits in spatial neglect.
Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1603–1610. doi:
10.1038/nn1574
Corbetta, M., and Shulman, G. L.
(2011). Spatial neglect and atten-
tion networks. Annu. Rev. Neurosci.
34, 569–599. doi: 10.1146/annurev-
neuro-061010-113731
Critchley, H., and Seth, A. (2012). Will
studies of macaque insula reveal
the neural mechanisms of self-
awareness.Neuron 74, 423–426. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.012
Crick, F., and Koch, C. (1995). Are we
aware of neural activity in primary
visual cortex? Nature 375, 121–123.
doi: 10.1038/375121a0
Cruse, D., Chennu, S., Chatelle, C.,
Bekinschtein, T. A., Fernandez-
Espejo, D., Pickard, J. D., et al.
(2011). Bedside detection of aware-
ness in the vegetative state: a cohort
study. Lancet 378, 2088–2094. doi:
10.1016/S0140-6736(11)61224-5
Cruse, D., Chennu, S., Fernandez-
Espejo, D., Payne, W. L., Young,
G. B., and Owen, A. M. (2012).
Detecting awareness in the vegeta-
tive state: electroencephalographic
evidence for attempted movements
to command. PLoS ONE 7:e49933.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0049933
Cui, H., and Andersen, R. A. (2007).
Posterior parietal cortex encodes
autonomously selected motor
plans. Neuron 56, 552–559. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2007.09.031
Dang-Vu, T. T., Bonjean, M., Schabus,
M., Boly, M., Darsaud, A.,
Desseilles, M., et al. (2011).
Interplay between spontaneous
and induced brain activity during
human non-rapid eye move-
ment sleep. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 108, 15438–15443. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1112503108
Dang-Vu, T. T., Schabus, M., Desseilles,
M., Albouy, G., Boly, M., Darsaud,
A., et al. (2008). Spontaneous
neural activity during human slow
wave sleep. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 105, 15160–15165. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0801819105
de Graaf, T. A., Hsieh, P. J., and
Sack, A. T. (2012). The ‘cor-
relates’ in neural correlates
of consciousness. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 36, 191–197. doi:
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.05.012
de Lange, F. P., van Gaal, S., Lamme,
V. A., and Dehaene, S. (2011).
How awareness changes the
relative weights of evidence dur-
ing human decision-making.
PLoS Biol. 9:e1001203. doi:
10.1371/journal.pbio.1001203
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J. P.
(2004). “Neural mechanisms for
access to consciousness,” in The
Cognitive Neurosciences, 3rd Edn.,
eds M. S. Gazanniga (New York,
NY: Norton), 1145–1157.
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J. P. (2005).
Ongoing spontaneous activity con-
trols access to consciousness: a
neuronal model for inattentional
blindness. PLoS Biol. 3:e141. doi:
10.1371/journal.pbio.0030141
Dehaene, S., and Changeux, J. P.
(2011). Experimental and theoret-
ical approaches to conscious pro-
cessing. Neuron 70, 200–227. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J. P., Naccache,
L., Sackur, J., and Sergent, C. (2006).
Conscious, preconscious, and sub-
liminal processing: a testable taxon-
omy. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 204–211.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007
Dehaene, S., and Naccache, L. (2001).
Towards a cognitive neuro-
science of consciousness: basic
evidence and a workspace frame-
work. Cognition 79, 1–37. doi:
10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Cohen,
L., Bihan, D. L., Mangin, J. F.,
Poline, J. B., et al. (2001). Cerebral
mechanisms of word masking and
unconscious repetition priming.
Nat. Neurosci. 4, 752–758. doi:
10.1038/89551
Deisseroth, K. (2011). Optogenetics.
Nat. Methods 8, 26–29. doi:
10.1038/nmeth.f.324
Del Cul, A., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S.
(2007). Brain dynamics underlying
the nonlinear threshold for access
to consciousness. PLoS Biol. 5:e260.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0050260
Demertzi, A., Soddu, A., and Laureys, S.
(2013). Consciousness supporting
networks. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 23,
239–244. doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2012.
12.003
Desmurget, M., and Sirigu, A. (2009).
A parietal-premotor network for
movement intention and motor
awareness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13,
411–419. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.
08.001
Diaz, M. T., and McCarthy, G.
(2007). Unconscious word pro-
cessing engages a distributed
network of brain regions. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 19, 1768–1775. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2007.19.11.1768
Diester, I., Kaufman, M. T., Mogri,
M., Pashaie, R., Goo, W., Yizhar,
O., et al. (2011). An optogenetic
toolbox designed for primates.
Nat. Neurosci. 14, 387–397. doi:
10.1038/nn.2749
Doesburg, S. M., Green, J. J.,
McDonald, J. J., and Ward, L.
M. (2009). Rhythms of conscious-
ness: binocular rivalry reveals
large-scale oscillatory network
dynamics mediating visual per-
ception. PLoS ONE 4:e6142. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0006142
Dresler, M., Koch, S. P., Wehrle, R.,
Spoormaker, V. I., Holsboer,
F., Steiger, A., et al. (2011).
Dreamed movement elicits activa-
tion in the sensorimotor cortex.
Curr. Biol. 21, 1833–1837. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2011.09.029
Dresler, M., Wehrle, R., Spoormaker, V.
I., Koch, S. P., Holsboer, F., Steiger,
A., et al. (2012). Neural correlates
of dream lucidity obtained from
contrasting lucid versus non-lucid
REM sleep: a combined EEG/fMRI
case study. Sleep 35, 1017–1020. doi:
10.5665/sleep.1974
Du, J., Blanche, T. J., Harrison, R. R.,
Lester, H. A., and Masmanidis, S. C.
(2011). Multiplexed, high density
electrophysiology with nanofab-
ricated neural probes. PLoS ONE
6:e26204. doi: 10.1371/journal.
pone.0026204
Edelman, D. B., Baars, B. J., and
Seth, A. K. (2005). Identifying
hallmarks of consciousness in
non-mammalian species. Conscious.
Cogn. 14, 169–187. doi: 10.1016/j.
concog.2004.09.001
Edelman, D. B., and Seth, A. K.
(2009). Animal consciousness: a
synthetic approach. Trends Neurosci.
32, 476–484. doi: 10.1016/j.tins.
2009.05.008
Edelman, G. M. (1989). The
Remembered Present: A Biological
Theory of Consciousness. New York,
NY: Basic Books.
Emery, N. J., and Clayton, N. S. (2004).
The mentality of crows: convergent
evolution of intelligence in corvids
and apes. Science 306, 1903–1907.
doi: 10.1126/science.1098410
Englot, D. J., Modi, B., Mishra,
A. M., DeSalvo, M., Hyder, F.,
and Blumenfeld, H. (2009).
Cortical deactivation induced by
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 625 | 15
Boly et al. Consciousness in humans and non-human animals
subcortical network dysfunction
in limbic seizures. J. Neurosci.
29, 13006–13018. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.3846-09.2009
Farrer, C., Frey, S. H., Van Horn, J. D.,
Tunik, E., Turk, D., Inati, S., et al.
(2008). The angular gyrus computes
action awareness representations.
Cereb. Cortex 18, 254–261. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhm050
Feinberg, T. E., and Mallatt, J. (2013).
The evolutionary and genetic
origins of consciousness in the
Cambrian Period over 500 million
years ago. Front. Psychol. 4:667. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00667
Feinberg, D. A., Moeller, S., Smith,
S. M., Auerbach, E., Ramanna,
S., Gunther, M., et al. (2010).
Multiplexed echo planar imaging
for sub-second whole brain FMRI
and fast diffusion imaging. PLoS
ONE 5:e15710. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0015710
Fernandez-Espejo, D., Soddu, A.,
Cruse, D., Palacios, E. M., Junque,
C., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., et al.
(2012). A role for the default mode
network in the bases of disorders
of consciousness. Ann. Neurol. 72,
335–343. doi: 10.1002/ana.23635
Ferrarelli, F., Massimini, M., Sarasso, S.,
Casali, A., Riedner, B. A., Angelini,
G., et al. (2010). Breakdown in
cortical effective connectivity dur-
ing midazolam-induced loss of
consciousness. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 107, 2681–2686. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0913008107
Fiorito, G., and Scotto, P. (1992).
Observational Learning in Octopus
vulgaris. Science 256, 545–547. doi:
10.1126/science.256.5056.545
Franklin, S., Wolpert, D. M., and
Franklin, D. W. (2012). Visuomotor
feedback gains upregulate during
the learning of novel dynamics.
J. Neurophysiol. 108, 467–478. doi:
10.1152/jn.01123.2011
Freeman, J., and Simoncelli, E. P.
(2011). Metamers of the ven-
tral stream. Nat. Neurosci. 14,
1195–1201. doi: 10.1038/nn.2889
Fries, P., Roelfsema, P. R., Engel,
A. K., Konig, P., and Singer, W.
(1997). Synchronization of oscil-
latory responses in visual cortex
correlates with perception in inte-
rocular rivalry. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 94, 12699–12704. doi:
10.1073/pnas.94.23.12699
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy
principle: a unified brain theory.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 11, 127–138. doi:
10.1038/nrn2787
Friston, K. (2012). Prediction, per-
ception and agency. Int. J.
Psychophysiol. 83, 248–252. doi:
10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2011.11.014
Friston, K., Moran, R., and Seth,
A. K. (2013). Analysing connec-
tivity with Granger causality and
dynamic causal modelling. Curr.
Opin. Neurobiol. 23, 172–178. doi:
10.1016/j.conb.2012.11.010
Frith, C. D., and Frith, U. (2007).
Social cognition in humans.
Curr. Biol. 17, R724–R732. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2007.05.068
Gail, A., Brinksmeyer, H. J., and
Eckhorn, R. (2004). Perception-
related modulations of local field
potential power and coherence in
primary visual cortex of awake
monkey during binocular rivalry.
Cereb. Cortex 14, 300–313. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhg129
Gaillard, R., Dehaene, S., Adam,
C., Clemenceau, S., Hasboun,
D., Baulac, M., et al. (2009).
Converging intracranial markers of
conscious access. PLoS Biol. 7:e61.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1000061
Gerits, A., Farivar, R., Rosen, B.
R., Wald, L. L., Boyden, E.
S., and Vanduffel, W. (2012).
Optogenetically induced behavioral
and functional network changes in
primates. Curr. Biol. 22, 1722–1726.
doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2012.07.023
Giacino, J. T., Ashwal, S., Childs, N.,
Cranford, R., Jennett, B., Katz, D.
I., et al. (2002). The minimally con-
scious state: definition and diagnos-
tic criteria. Neurology 58, 349–353.
doi: 10.1212/WNL.58.3.349
Giacino, J. T., Whyte, J., Bagiella, E.,
Kalmar, K., Childs, N., Khademi,
A., et al. (2012). Placebo-controlled
trial of amantadine for severe
traumatic brain injury. N.
Engl. J. Med. 366, 819–826. doi:
10.1056/NEJMoa1102609
Grefkes, C., and Fink, G. R. (2005).
The functional organization of the
intraparietal sulcus in humans and
monkeys. J. Anat. 207, 3–17. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-7580.2005.00426.x
Grill-Spector, K., and Kanwisher,
N. (2005). Visual recogni-
tion: as soon as you know it
is there, you know what it is.
Psychol. Sci. 16, 152–160. doi:
10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.00796.x
Grill-Spector, K., Kushnir, T., Hendler,
T., and Malach, R. (2000). The
dynamics of object-selective activa-
tion correlate with recognition per-
formance in humans. Nat. Neurosci.
3, 837–843. doi: 10.1038/77754
Gross, J., Schmitz, F., Schnitzler, I.,
Kessler, K., Shapiro, K., Hommel, B.,
et al. (2004). Modulation of long-
range neural synchrony reflects tem-
poral limitations of visual atten-
tion in humans. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 101, 13050–13055. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0404944101
Hagmann, P., Cammoun, L., Gigandet,
X., Meuli, R., Honey, C. J., Wedeen,
V. J., et al. (2008). Mapping the
structural core of human cere-
bral cortex. PLoS Biol. 6:e159. doi:
10.1371/journal.pbio.0060159
Haider, B., Hausser, M., and Carandini,
M. (2013). Inhibition dominates
sensory responses in the awake
cortex. Nature 493, 97–100. doi:
10.1038/nature11665
Harvey, C. D., Coen, P., and Tank,
D. W. (2012). Choice-specific
sequences in parietal cortex dur-
ing a virtual-navigation decision
task. Nature 484, 62–68. doi:
10.1038/nature10918
Hawrylycz, M. J., Lein, E. S., Guillozet-
Bongaarts, A. L., Shen, E. H., Ng,
L., Miller, J. A., et al. (2012). An
anatomically comprehensive atlas of
the adult human brain transcrip-
tome. Nature 489, 391–399. doi:
10.1038/nature11405
Haynes, J. D., and Rees, G. (2005).
Predicting the stream of conscious-
ness from activity in human visual
cortex. Curr. Biol. 15, 1301–1307.
doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2005.06.026
Hesselmann, G., Hebart, M., and
Malach, R. (2011). Differential
BOLD activity associated with sub-
jective and objective reports during
“blindsight” in normal observers.
J. Neurosci. 31, 12936–12944. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1556-11.2011
Hesselmann, G., and Malach, R.
(2011). The link between fMRI-
BOLD activation and perceptual
awareness is “stream-invariant”
in the human visual system.
Cereb. Cortex 21, 2829–2837. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhr085
Hipp, J. F., Engel, A. K., and Siegel,
M. (2011). Oscillatory synchro-
nization in large-scale cortical
networks predicts percep-
tion. Neuron 69, 387–396. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2010.12.027
Hohwy, J. (2012). Attention and con-
scious perception in the hypothesis
testing brain. Front. Psychol. 3:96.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096
Horikawa, T., Tamaki, M., Miyawaki,
Y., and Kamitani, Y. (2013). Neural
decoding of visual imagery during
sleep. Science 340, 639–642. doi:
10.1126/science.1234330
Horovitz, S. G., Braun, A. R., Carr,
W. S., Picchioni, D., Balkin, T.
J., Fukunaga, M., et al. (2009).
Decoupling of the brain’s default
mode network during deep
sleep. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 106, 11376–11381. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0901435106
Hwang, E. J., Hauschild, M., Wilke,
M., and Andersen, R. A. (2012).
Inactivation of the parietal reach
region causes optic ataxia, impair-
ing reaches but not saccades.
Neuron 76, 1021–1029. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.030
Imas, O. A., Ropella, K. M., Ward,
B. D., Wood, J. D., and Hudetz,
A. G. (2005). Volatile anesthet-
ics disrupt frontal-posterior
recurrent information transfer
at gamma frequencies in rat.
Neurosci. Lett. 387, 145–150. doi:
10.1016/j.neulet.2005.06.018
Jox, R. J., Bernat, J. L., Laureys, S., and
Racine, E. (2012). Disorders of con-
sciousness: responding to requests
for novel diagnostic and thera-
peutic interventions. Lancet Neurol.
11, 732–738. doi: 10.1016/S1474-
4422(12)70154-0
Kagan, I., Iyer, A., Lindner, A., and
Andersen, R. A. (2010). Space
representation for eye movements
is more contralateral in monkeys
than in humans. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 107, 7933–7938. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1002825107
Kanai, R., Tsuchiya, N., and Verstraten,
F. A. (2006). The scope and
limits of top-down attention in
unconscious visual processing.
Curr. Biol. 16, 2332–2336. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2006.10.001
Kang, M. S., Blake, R., and Woodman,
G. F. (2011). Semantic analysis
does not occur in the absence
of awareness induced by inte-
rocular suppression. J. Neurosci.
31, 13535–13545. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.1691-11.2011
Karnath, H. O., Ferber, S., and
Himmelbach, M. (2001). Spatial
awareness is a function of the
temporal not the posterior parietal
lobe. Nature 411, 950–953. doi:
10.1038/35082075
Karnath, H. O., Himmelbach, M., and
Rorden, C. (2002). The subcortical
anatomy of human spatial neglect:
putamen, caudate nucleus and pul-
vinar. Brain 125(Pt 2), 350–360. doi:
10.1093/brain/awf032
Karten, H. J. (2013). Neocortical
evolution: neuronal circuits arise
independently of lamination.
Curr. Biol. 23, R12–R15. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2012.11.013
Keliris, G. A., Logothetis, N. K., and
Tolias, A. S. (2010). The role of the
primary visual cortex in perceptual
suppression of salient visual stim-
uli. J. Neurosci. 30, 12353–12365.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0677-10.
2010
Kerkhoff, G. (2001). Spatial hemine-
glect in humans. Prog. Neurobiol. 63,
1–27. doi: 10.1016/S0301-0082(00)
00028-9
Kim, C. Y., and Blake, R. (2005).
Psychophysical magic: rendering the
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 625 | 16
Boly et al. Consciousness in humans and non-human animals
visible ‘invisible’. Trends Cogn. Sci.
9, 381–388. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.
06.012
Koch, C., and Tsuchiya, N. (2007).
Attention and consciousness:
two distinct brain processes.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 16–22. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.10.012
Koivisto, M., Kainulainen, P., and
Revonsuo, A. (2009). The rela-
tionship between awareness
and attention: evidence from
ERP responses. Neuropsychologia
47, 2891–2899. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2009.06.016
Koivisto, M., and Revonsuo, A.
(2008). The role of selective
attention in visual awareness of
stimulus features: electrophys-
iological studies. Cogn. Affect.
Behav. Neurosci. 8, 195–210. doi:
10.3758/CABN.8.2.195
Komura, Y., Nikkuni, A., Hirashima,
N., Uetake, T., and Miyamoto, A.
(2013). Responses of pulvinar neu-
rons reflect a subject’s confidence in
visual categorization. Nat. Neurosci.
16, 749–755. doi: 10.1038/nn.3393
Kouider, S., de Gardelle, V., Sackur,
J., and Dupoux, E. (2010). How
rich is consciousness. the par-
tial awareness hypothesis. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 14, 301–307. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.006
Kouider, S., and Dehaene, S. (2007).
Levels of processing during
non-conscious perception: a
critical review of visual mask-
ing. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond.
B Biol. Sci. 362, 857–875. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2007.2093
Kouider, S., and Dupoux, E. (2004).
Partial awareness creates the
“illusion” of subliminal seman-
tic priming. Psychol. Sci. 15,
75–81. doi: 10.1111/j.0963-
7214.2004.01502001.x
Kouider, S., Sackur, J., and Gardelle,
V. (2012). Do we still need phe-
nomenal consciousness. Comment
on Block. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16,
140–1. author reply: 1–2. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2012.01.003
Kouider, S., Stahlhut, C., Gelskov, S.
V., Barbosa, L. S., Dutat, M., de
Gardelle, V., et al. (2013). A neural
marker of perceptual consciousness
in infants. Science 340, 376–380. doi:
10.1126/science.1232509
Kreiman, G., Fried, I., and Koch,
C. (2002). Single-neuron correlates
of subjective vision in the human
medial temporal lobe. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 99, 8378–8383. doi:
10.1073/pnas.072194099
Lambert, I., Arthuis, M., McGonigal,
A., Wendling, F., and Bartolomei,
F. (2012). Alteration of global
workspace during loss of
consciousness: a study of parietal
seizures. Epilepsia 53, 2104–2110.
doi: 10.1111/j.1528-1167.2012.
03690.x
Lamme, V. A. (2006). Towards a true
neural stance on consciousness.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 494–501. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001
Lamme, V. A. (2010). How neu-
roscience will change our
view on consciousness. Cogn.
Neurosci. 1, 204–220. doi: 10.1080/
17588921003731586
Lau, H. C., and Passingham, R.
E. (2006). Relative blindsight
in normal observers and the
neural correlate of visual con-
sciousness. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 103, 18763–18768. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0607716103
Laureys, S. (2005). The neural cor-
relate of (un)awareness: lessons
from the vegetative state. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 9, 556–559. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.010
Laureys, S., and Boly, M. (2008). The
changing spectrum of coma. Nat.
Clin. Pract. Neurol. 4, 544–546. doi:
10.1038/ncpneuro0887
Laureys, S., Boly, M., and Maquet,
P. (2006). Tracking the recovery
of consciousness from coma.
J. Clin. Invest. 116, 1823–1825. doi:
10.1172/JCI29172
Laureys, S., Faymonville, M. E.,
Degueldre, C., Fiore, G. D.,
Damas, P., Lambermont, B.,
et al. (2000a). Auditory pro-
cessing in the vegetative state.
Brain 123(Pt 8), 1589–1601. doi:
10.1093/brain/123.8.1589
Laureys, S., Faymonville, M. E., Luxen,
A., Lamy, M., Franck, G., and
Maquet, P. (2000b). Restoration
of thalamocortical connectivity
after recovery from persistent
vegetative state. Lancet 355,
1790–1791. doi: 10.1016/S0140-
6736(00)02271-6
Laureys, S., Faymonville, M.
E., Peigneux, P., Damas, P.,
Lambermont, B., Del Fiore, G.,
et al. (2002). Cortical processing
of noxious somatosensory stimuli
in the persistent vegetative state.
Neuroimage 17, 732–741. doi:
10.1006/nimg.2002.1236
Laureys, S., and Schiff, N. D.
(2012). Coma and conscious-
ness: paradigms (re)framed
by neuroimaging. Neuroimage
61, 478–491. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2011.12.041
Lee, U., Kim, S., Noh, G. J., Choi, B.
M., Hwang, E., and Mashour, G. A.
(2009). The directionality and func-
tional organization of frontopari-
etal connectivity during conscious-
ness and anesthesia in humans.
Conscious. Cogn. 18, 1069–1078.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.04.004
Lehky, S. R., andMaunsell, J. H. (1996).
No binocular rivalry in the LGN of
alert macaque monkeys. Vision Res.
36, 1225–1234. doi: 10.1016/0042-
6989(95)00232-4
Leopold, D. A. (2012). Primary visual
cortex: awareness and blindsight.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 35, 91–109.
doi: 10.1146/annurev-neuro-
062111-150356
Leopold, D. A., and Logothetis, N.
K. (1996). Activity changes in
early visual cortex reflect mon-
keys’ percepts during binocular
rivalry. Nature 379, 549–553. doi:
10.1038/379549a0
Leopold, D. A., and Logothetis, N.
K. (1999). Multistable phenom-
ena: changing views in perception.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 3, 254–264. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01332-7
Leopold, D. A., Maier, A., and
Logothetis, N. K. (2003). Measuring
subjective visual perception in the
nonhuman primate. J. Conscious.
Stud. 10, 115–130.
Lewis, L. D., Weiner, V. S., Mukamel,
E. A., Donoghue, J. A., Eskandar,
E. N., Madsen, J. R., et al. (2012).
Rapid fragmentation of neu-
ronal networks at the onset of
propofol-induced unconsciousness.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109,
E3377–E3386. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
1210907109
Libedinsky, C., and Livingstone, M.
(2011). Role of prefrontal cor-
tex in conscious visual percep-
tion. J. Neurosci. 31, 64–69. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3620-10.2011
Llinas, R., Ribary, U., Contreras, D.,
and Pedroarena, C. (1998). The
neuronal basis for consciousness.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B
Biol. Sci. 353, 1841–1849. doi:
10.1098/rstb.1998.0336
Logothetis, N. K. (2008). What we can
do and what we cannot do with
fMRI. Nature 453, 869–878. doi:
10.1038/nature06976
Logothetis, N. K., and Schall, J.
D. (1989). Neuronal correlates
of subjective visual percep-
tion. Science 245, 761–763. doi:
10.1126/science.2772635
Luo, Q., Mitchell, D., Cheng, X.,
Mondillo, K., McCaffrey, D.,
Holroyd, T., et al. (2009). Visual
awareness, emotion, and gamma
band synchronization. Cereb.
Cortex 19, 1896–1904. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhn216
Lynn, C., and Curran, W. (2010). A
comparison of monkey and human
motion processing mechanisms.
Vision Res. 50, 2137–2141. doi:
10.1016/j.visres.2010.08.007
Maier, A., Logothetis, N. K., and
Leopold, D. A. (2007). Context-
dependent perceptual modulation
of single neurons in primate
visual cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 104, 5620–5625. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0608489104
Maier, A., Wilke, M., Aura, C., Zhu,
C., Ye, F. Q., and Leopold, D. A.
(2008). Divergence of fMRI and
neural signals in V1 during percep-
tual suppression in the awake mon-
key. Nat. Neurosci. 11, 1193–1200.
doi: 10.1038/nn.2173
Majerus, S., Gill-Thwaites, H.,
Andrews, K., and Laureys, S. (2005).
Behavioral evaluation of conscious-
ness in severe brain damage. Prog.
Brain Res. 150, 397–413. doi:
10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50028-1
Maniscalco, B., and Lau, H. (2012). A
signal detection theoretic approach
for estimating metacognitive
sensitivity from confidence
ratings. Conscious. Cogn. 21,
422–430. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.
2011.09.021
Mantini, D., Corbetta, M., Perrucci,
M. G., Romani, G. L., and Del
Gratta, C. (2009). Large-scale
brain networks account for
sustained and transient activ-
ity during target detection.
Neuroimage 44, 265–274. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.08.019
Mashour, G. A., and Alkire, M. T.
(2013). Evolution of conscious-
ness: phylogeny, ontogeny, and
emergence from general anesthe-
sia. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
110(Suppl. 2), 10357–10364. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1301188110
Mashour, G. A., Orser, B. A.,
and Avidan, M. S. (2011).
Intraoperative awareness: from
neurobiology to clinical practice.
Anesthesiology 114, 1218–1233. doi:
10.1097/ALN.0b013e31820fc9b6
Massimini, M., Boly, M., Casali, A.,
Rosanova, M., and Tononi, G.
(2009). A perturbational approach
for evaluating the brain’s capacity
for consciousness. Prog. Brain Res.
177, 201–214. doi: 10.1016/S0079-
6123(09)17714-2
Massimini, M., Ferrarelli, F., Esser,
S. K., Riedner, B. A., Huber,
R., Murphy, M., et al. (2007).
Triggering sleep slow waves by
transcranial magnetic stimulation.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104,
8496–8501. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
0702495104
Massimini, M., Ferrarelli, F., Huber,
R., Esser, S. K., Singh, H., and
Tononi, G. (2005). Breakdown of
cortical effective connectivity dur-
ing sleep. Science 309, 2228–2232.
doi: 10.1126/science.1117256
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 625 | 17
Boly et al. Consciousness in humans and non-human animals
Mather, J. A. (2008). Cephalopod con-
sciousness: behavioural evidence.
Conscious. Cogn. 17, 37–48. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2006.11.006
Mathewson, K. E., Gratton, G.,
Fabiani, M., Beck, D. M., and Ro,
T. (2009). To see or not to see:
prestimulus alpha phase predicts
visual awareness. J. Neurosci.
29, 2725–2732. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.3963-08.2009
Melloni, L., Molina, C., Pena,
M., Torres, D., Singer, W.,
and Rodriguez, E. (2007).
Synchronization of neural activity
across cortical areas correlates with
conscious perception. J. Neurosci.
27, 2858–2865. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.4623-06.2007
Monti, M. M., Vanhaudenhuyse, A.,
Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Pickard,
J. D., Tshibanda, L., et al. (2010).
Willful modulation of brain activ-
ity in disorders of consciousness.
N. Engl. J. Med. 362, 579–589. doi:
10.1056/NEJMoa0905370
Mort, D. J., Malhotra, P., Mannan,
S. K., Rorden, C., Pambakian,
A., Kennard, C., et al. (2003).
The anatomy of visual neglect.
Brain 126(Pt 9), 1986–1997. doi:
10.1093/brain/awg200
Mudrik, L., Breska, A., Lamy, D., and
Deouell, L. Y. (2011). Integration
without awareness: expanding the
limits of unconscious processing.
Psychol. Sci. 22, 764–770. doi:
10.1177/0956797611408736
Mukamel, R., and Fried, I. (2012).
Human intracranial recordings and
cognitive neuroscience. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 63, 511–537. doi: 10.1146/
annurev-psych-120709-145401
Murphy, M., Bruno, M. A., Riedner,
B. A., Boveroux, P., Noirhomme,
Q., Landsness, E. C., et al. (2011).
Propofol anesthesia and sleep: a
high-density EEG study. Sleep 34,
283A–291A.
Nielsen, K. J., Callaway, E. M.,
and Krauzlis, R. J. (2012). Viral
vector-based reversible neuronal
inactivation and behavioral manip-
ulation in the macaque monkey.
Front. Syst. Neurosci. 6:48. doi:
10.3389/fnsys.2012.00048
Nir, Y., Staba, R. J., Andrillon, T.,
Vyazovskiy, V. V., Cirelli, C., Fried,
I., et al. (2011). Regional slow
waves and spindles in human sleep.
Neuron 70, 153–169. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuron.2011.02.043
Nir, Y., and Tononi, G. (2010).
Dreaming and the brain: from phe-
nomenology to neurophysiology.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 88–100. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.001
Nobili, L., De Gennaro, L., Proserpio,
P., Moroni, F., Sarasso, S., Pigorini,
A., et al. (2012). Local aspects of
sleep: observations from intrac-
erebral recordings in humans.
Prog. Brain Res. 199, 219–232.
doi: 10.1016/B978-0-444-59427-
3.00013-7
Orban, G. A., Van Essen, D., and
Vanduffel, W. (2004). Comparative
mapping of higher visual areas in
monkeys and humans. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 8, 315–324. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2004.05.009
Overgaard, M., Rote, J., Mouridsen,
K., and Ramsoy, T. Z. (2006). Is
conscious perception gradual or
dichotomous. A comparison of
report methodologies during a
visual task. Conscious. Cogn. 15,
700–708. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.
2006.04.002
Overgaard, M., and Sandberg, K.
(2012). Kinds of access: differ-
ent methods for report reveal
different kinds of metacognitive
access. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond.
B Biol. Sci. 367, 1287–1296. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2011.0425
Owen, A. M. (2013). Detecting con-
sciousness: a unique role for
neuroimaging. Annu. Rev. Psychol.
64, 109–133. doi: 10.1146/annurev-
psych-113011-143729
Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly,
M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., and
Pickard, J. D. (2006). Detecting
awareness in the vegetative state.
Science 313, 1402. doi: 10.1126/sci-
ence.1130197
Panagiotaropoulos, T. I., Deco, G.,
Kapoor, V., and Logothetis, N.
K. (2012). Neuronal discharges
and gamma oscillations explic-
itly reflect visual consciousness
in the lateral prefrontal cor-
tex. Neuron 74, 924–935. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.013
Pelli, D. G., and Tillman, K. A. (2008).
The uncrowded window of object
recognition. Nat. Neurosci. 11,
1129–1135. doi: 10.1038/nn.2187
Pepperberg, I. M. (2006). Grey parrot
numerical competence: a review.
Anim. Cogn. 9, 377–391. doi:
10.1007/s10071-006-0034-7
Persaud, N., Davidson, M., Maniscalco,
B., Mobbs, D., Passingham, R.
E., Cowey, A., et al. (2011).
Awareness-related activity in
prefrontal and parietal cortices
in blindsight reflects more than
superior visual performance.
Neuroimage 58, 605–611. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.06.081
Prakash, R., Yizhar, O., Grewe, B.,
Ramakrishnan, C., Wang, N.,
Goshen, I., et al. (2012). Two-
photon optogenetic toolbox for
fast inhibition, excitation and
bistable modulation. Nat. Methods
9, 1171–1179. doi: 10.1038/nmeth.
2215
Purdon, P. L., Pierce, E. T., Mukamel,
E. A., Prerau, M. J., Walsh, J.
L., Wong, K. F., et al. (2013).
Electroencephalogram signatures of
loss and recovery of consciousness
from propofol. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 110, E1142–E1151. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1221180110
Rattenborg, N. C., Martinez-Gonzalez,
D., and Lesku, J. A. (2009). Avian
sleep homeostasis: convergent
evolution of complex brains,
cognition and sleep functions in
mammals and birds. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 33, 253–270. doi:
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.08.010
Reiner, A., Yamamoto, K., and Karten,
H. J. (2005). Organization and
evolution of the avian forebrain.
Anat. Rec. A Discov. Mol. Cell.
Evol. Biol. 287, 1080–1102. doi:
10.1002/ar.a.20253
Remington, E. D., Osmanski, M. S.,
and Wang, X. (2012). An oper-
ant conditioning method for study-
ing auditory behaviors in marmoset
monkeys. PLoS ONE 7:e47895. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0047895
Rosanova, M., Gosseries, O., Casarotto,
S., Boly, M., Casali, A. G., Bruno,
M. A., et al. (2012). Recovery
of cortical effective connectivity
and recovery of consciousness
in vegetative patients. Brain
135(Pt 4), 1308–1320. doi:
10.1093/brain/awr340
Rosenholtz, R., Huang, J., and Ehinger,
K. A. (2012). Rethinking the role of
top-down attention in vision: effects
attributable to a lossy representation
in peripheral vision. Front. Psychol.
3:13. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00013
Rosenthal, D. M. (2000).
Consciousness, content, and
metacognitive judgments.
Conscious. Cogn. 9(2 Pt 1), 203–214.
doi: 10.1006/ccog.2000.0437
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005). Consciousness
and Mind. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Saalmann, Y. B., and Kastner, S.
(2011). Cognitive and perceptual
functions of the visual thala-
mus. Neuron 71, 209–223. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2011.06.027
Sadaghiani, S., Hesselmann, G.,
Friston, K. J., and Kleinschmidt,
A. (2010). The relation of ongoing
brain activity, evoked neu-
ral responses, and cognition.
Front. Syst. Neurosci. 4:20. doi:
10.3389/fnsys.2010.00020
Sadaghiani, S., Hesselmann, G.,
and Kleinschmidt, A. (2009).
Distributed and antagonistic
contributions of ongoing activ-
ity fluctuations to auditory
stimulus detection. J. Neurosci.
29, 13410–13417. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.2592-09.2009
Salwiczek, L. H., Watanabe, A., and
Clayton, N. S. (2010). Ten years
of research into avian models
of episodic-like memory and its
implications for developmental
and comparative cognition. Behav.
Brain Res. 215, 221–234. doi:
10.1016/j.bbr.2010.06.011
Samann, P. G., Wehrle, R., Hoehn,
D., Spoormaker, V. I., Peters, H.,
Tully, C., et al. (2011). Development
of the brain’s default mode net-
work from wakefulness to slow wave
sleep. Cereb. Cortex 21, 2082–2093.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhq295
Sandberg, K., Bibby, B. M.,
Timmermans, B., Cleeremans,
A., and Overgaard, M. (2011).
Measuring consciousness: task
accuracy and awareness as sigmoid
functions of stimulus duration.
Conscious. Cogn. 20, 1659–1675.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.09.002
Sanders, R. D., Tononi, G., Laureys,
S., and Sleigh, J. (2012).
Unresponsiveness not equal
Unconsciousness. Anesthesiology
116, 946–959. doi: 10.1097/ALN.
0b013e318249d0a7
Sasaki, E., Suemizu, H., Shimada,
A., Hanazawa, K., Oiwa, R.,
Kamioka, M., et al. (2009).
Generation of transgenic non-
human primates with germline
transmission. Nature 459, 523–527.
doi: 10.1038/nature08090
Schabus, M., Dang-Vu, T. T., Albouy,
G., Balteau, E., Boly, M., Carrier,
J., et al. (2007). Hemodynamic
cerebral correlates of sleep spin-
dles during human non-rapid eye
movement sleep. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 104, 13164–13169. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0703084104
Schabus, M., Dang-Vu, T. T., Heib,
D. P., Boly, M., Desseilles, M.,
Vandewalle, G., et al. (2012). The
fate of incoming stimuli during
NREM sleep is determined by spin-
dles and the phase of the slow
oscillation. Front. Neurol. 3:40. doi:
10.3389/fneur.2012.00040
Schiff, N. D. (2010). Recovery
of consciousness after brain
injury: a mesocircuit hypothesis.
Trends Neurosci. 33, 1–9. doi:
10.1016/j.tins.2009.11.002
Schiff, N. D., Giacino, J. T., Kalmar,
K., Victor, J. D., Baker, K., Gerber,
M., et al. (2007). Behavioural
improvements with thalamic stim-
ulation after severe traumatic brain
injury. Nature 448, 600–603. doi:
10.1038/nature06041
Schmid, M. C., Mrowka, S. W., Turchi,
J., Saunders, R. C., Wilke, M.,
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 625 | 18
Boly et al. Consciousness in humans and non-human animals
Peters, A. J., et al. (2010). Blindsight
depends on the lateral geniculate
nucleus. Nature 466, 373–377. doi:
10.1038/nature09179
Schnakers, C., Ledoux, D., Majerus, S.,
Damas, P., Damas, F., Lambermont,
B., et al. (2008). Diagnostic and
prognostic use of bispectral index
in coma, vegetative state and related
disorders. Brain Inj. 22, 926–931.
doi: 10.1080/02699050802530565
Schurger, A., Cowey, A., Tallon-Baudry,
C. (2006). Induced gamma-band
oscillations correlate with aware-
ness in hemianopic patient GY.
Neuropsychologia 44, 1796–1803.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.
2006.03.015
Scott, R. B., Minati, L., Dienes,
Z., Critchley, H. D., and
Seth, A. K. (2011). Detecting
conscious awareness from invol-
untary autonomic responses.
Conscious. Cogn. 20, 936–942. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2010.11.009
Sergent, C., Baillet, S., and Dehaene,
S. (2005). Timing of the brain
events underlying access to con-
sciousness during the attentional
blink. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1391–1400.
doi: 10.1038/nn1549
Sergent, C., and Dehaene, S. (2004).
Is consciousness a gradual
phenomenon. Evidence for
an all-or-none bifurcation
during the attentional blink.
Psychol. Sci. 15, 720–728. doi:
10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00748.x
Seth, A. K. (2010). The grand challenge
of consciousness. Front. Psychol. 1:5.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00005
Seth, A. K., Baars, B. J., and Edelman,
D. B. (2005). Criteria for conscious-
ness in humans and other mam-
mals. Conscious. Cogn. 14, 119–139.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2004.08.006
Seth, A. K., Barrett, A. B., and
Barnett, L. (2011a). Causal den-
sity and integrated information
as measures of conscious level.
Philos. Trans. A Math. Phys.
Eng. Sci. 369, 3748–3767. doi:
10.1098/rsta.2011.0079
Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., and Critchley,
H. D. (2011b). An interoceptive pre-
dictive coding model of conscious
presence. Front. Psychol. 2:395. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00395
Seth, A. K., and Critchley, H. D.
(2013). Extending predictive
processing to the body: emo-
tion as interoceptive inference.
Behav. Brain Sci. 36, 227–228. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X12002270
Seth, A. K., Dienes, Z., Cleeremans,
A., Overgaard, M., and Pessoa,
L. (2008). Measuring conscious-
ness: relating behavioural and
neurophysiological approaches.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 314–321. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.008
Shanahan, M. (2008). A spik-
ing neuron model of cortical
broadcast and competition.
Conscious. Cogn. 17, 288–303.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.12.005
Sheinberg, D. L., and Logothetis, N.
K. (1997). The role of tempo-
ral cortical areas in perceptual
organization. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 94, 3408–3413. doi:
10.1073/pnas.94.7.3408
Sherman, S. M., and Guillery, R. W.
(2002). The role of the thalamus
in the flow of information to the
cortex. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond.
B Biol. Sci. 357, 1695–1708. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2002.1161
Singh, K. D. (2012). Which “neural
activity” do you mean? fMRI, MEG,
oscillations and neurotransmitters.
Neuroimage 62, 1121–1130. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.01.028
Sirotin, Y. B., and Das, A. (2009).
Anticipatory haemodynamic
signals in sensory cortex not pre-
dicted by local neuronal activity.
Nature 457, 475–479. doi: 10.1038/
nature07664
Sklar, A. Y., Levy, N., Goldstein, A.,
Mandel, R.,Maril, A., andHassin, R.
R. (2012). Reading and doing arith-
metic nonconsciously. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, 19614–19619.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1211645109
Smith, J. D., Redford, J. S., and Haas,
S. M. (2009). The comparative psy-
chophysics of complex shape per-
ception. Anim. Cogn. 12, 809–821.
doi: 10.1007/s10071-009-0240-1
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., and
Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious
determinants of free decisions in
the human brain. Nat. Neurosci. 11,
543–545. doi: 10.1038/nn.2112
Stoerig, P., and Cowey, A. (1995).
Visual perception and phenome-
nal consciousness. Behav. Brain Res.
71, 147–156. doi: 10.1016/0166-
4328(95)00050-X
Stopfer, M., Bhagavan, S., Smith, B. H.,
and Laurent, G. (1997). Impaired
odour discrimination on desyn-
chronization of odour-encoding
neural assemblies. Nature 390,
70–74. doi: 10.1038/36335
Tallon-Baudry, C. (2003).
Oscillatory synchrony and
human visual cognition.
J. Physiol. Paris 97, 355–363. doi:
10.1016/j.jphysparis.2003.09.009
Tallon-Baudry, C. (2011). On the
neural mechanisms subserving
consciousness and attention.
Front. Psychol. 2:397. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00397
Tong, F. (2003). Primary visual cor-
tex and visual awareness. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 4, 219–229. doi:
10.1038/nrn1055
Tong, F., and Engel, S. A. (2001).
Interocular rivalry revealed in the
human cortical blind-spot represen-
tation. Nature 411, 195–199. doi:
10.1038/35075583
Tong, F., Meng, M., and Blake,
R. (2006). Neural bases of
binocular rivalry. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 10, 502–511. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.003
Tong, F., Nakayama, K., Vaughan,
J. T., and Kanwisher, N. (1998).
Binocular rivalry and visual
awareness in human extrastriate
cortex. Neuron 21, 753–759. doi:
10.1016/S0896-6273(00)80592-9
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as
integrated information: a provi-
sional manifesto. Biol. Bull. 215,
216–242. doi: 10.2307/25470707
Tononi, G., and Koch, C. (2008).
The neural correlates of con-
sciousness: an update. Ann. N.Y.
Acad. Sci. 1124, 239–261. doi:
10.1196/annals.1440.004
Tononi, G., and Massimini, M.
(2008). Why does consciousness
fade in early sleep. Ann. N.Y.
Acad. Sci. 1129, 330–334. doi:
10.1196/annals.1417.024
Tse, P. U., Martinez-Conde, S., Schlegel,
A. A., and Macknik, S. L. (2005).
Visibility, visual awareness, and
visual masking of simple unat-
tended targets are confined to
areas in the occipital cortex beyond
human V1/V2. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 102, 17178–17183. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0508010102
Tsuchiya, N., and Koch, C. (2005).
Continuous flash suppression
reduces negative afterimages.
Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1096–1101. doi:
10.1038/nn1500
Tsuchiya, N., Koch, C., Gilroy, L. A.,
and Blake, R. (2006). Depth of
interocular suppression associated
with continuous flash suppression,
flash suppression, and binocular
rivalry. J. Vis. 6, 1068–1078. doi:
10.1167/6.10.6
Uhlhaas, P. J., Pipa, G.,
Neuenschwander, S., Wibral,
M., and Singer, W. (2011). A
new look at gamma. High-
(>60Hz) gamma-band activity
in cortical networks: function,
mechanisms and impairment. Prog.
Biophys. Mol. Biol. 105, 14–28. doi:
10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2010.10.004
Vaishnavi, S. N., Vlassenko, A. G.,
Rundle, M. M., Snyder, A. Z.,
Mintun, M. A., and Raichle, M.
E. (2010). Regional aerobic glycoly-
sis in the human brain. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 17757–17762.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1010459107
van Aalderen-Smeets, S. I., Oostenveld,
R., and Schwarzbach, J. (2006).
Investigating neurophysiological
correlates of metacontrast masking
with magnetoencephalography.
Adv. Cogn. Psychol. 2, 21–35. doi:
10.2478/v10053-008-0042-z
van Boxtel, J. J., Tsuchiya, N., and
Koch, C. (2010). Opposing effects
of attention and consciousness
on afterimages. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 107, 8883–8888. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0913292107
Van Essen, D. C., Ugurbil, K., Auerbach,
E., Barch, D., Behrens, T. E.,
Bucholz, R., et al. (2012). The
human connectome project: a data
acquisition perspective. Neuroimage
62, 2222–2231. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2012.02.018
van Gaal, S., and Lamme, V. A. (2012).
Unconscious high-level information
processing: implication for neuro-
biological theories of conscious-
ness. Neuroscientist 18, 287–301.
doi: 10.1177/1073858411404079
van Gaal, S., Lamme, V. A., Fahrenfort,
J. J., and Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2011).
Dissociable brain mechanisms
underlying the conscious and
unconscious control of behavior.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 91–105. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2010.21431
van Gaal, S., Lamme, V. A., and
Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2010).
Unconsciously triggered conflict
adaptation. PLoS ONE 5:e11508.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0011508
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Noirhomme,
Q., Tshibanda, L. J., Bruno, M.
A., Boveroux, P., Schnakers,
C., et al. (2010). Default net-
work connectivity reflects the
level of consciousness in non-
communicative brain-damaged
patients. Brain 133(Pt 1), 161–171.
doi: 10.1093/brain/awp313
Vanrullen, R., Busch, N. A., Drewes,
J., and Dubois, J. (2011). Ongoing
EEG Phase as a trial-by-trial pre-
dictor of perceptual and attentional
variability. Front. Psychol. 2:60. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00060
Venken, K. J., Simpson, J. H., and
Bellen, H. J. (2011). Genetic
manipulation of genes and cells
in the nervous system of the fruit
fly. Neuron 72, 202–230. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2011.09.021
Vincent, J. L., Patel, G. H., Fox, M.
D., Snyder, A. Z., Baker, J. T., Van
Essen, D. C., et al. (2007). Intrinsic
functional architecture in the anaes-
thetized monkey brain. Nature 447,
83–86. doi: 10.1038/nature05758
Viventi, J., Kim, D. H., Vigeland, L.,
Frechette, E. S., Blanco, J. A., Kim,
Y. S., et al. (2011). Flexible, foldable,
actively multiplexed, high-density
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 625 | 19
Boly et al. Consciousness in humans and non-human animals
electrode array for mapping brain
activity in vivo. Nat. Neurosci. 14,
1599–1605. doi: 10.1038/nn.2973
Vogel, E. K., Luck, S. J., and Shapiro, K.
L. (1998). Electrophysiological evi-
dence for a postperceptual locus of
suppression during the attentional
blink. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 24, 1656–1674. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.24.6.1656
Voss, U., Holzmann, R., Tuin, I.,
and Hobson, J. A. (2009). Lucid
dreaming: a state of conscious-
ness with features of both waking
and non-lucid dreaming. Sleep 32,
1191–1200.
Vossel, S., Kukolja, J., and Fink,
G. R. (2010). [Neurobiology of
neglect: implications for new
therapeutic strategies]. Fortschr.
Neurol. Psychiatr. 78, 733–745. doi:
10.1055/s-0029-1245862
Wang, Z., Logothetis, N. K., and Liang,
H. (2009). Extraction of percept-
related induced local field potential
during spontaneously reversing
perception. Neural Netw. 22,
720–727. doi: 10.1016/j.neunet.
2009.06.037
Wardak, C., Olivier, E., and Duhamel,
J. R. (2002a). Neglect in Monkeys:
Effect of Permanent and Reversible
Lesions, eds H. O. Karnath, D.
Milner, and G. Vallar (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
Wardak, C., Olivier, E., and Duhamel,
J. R. (2002b). Saccadic target selec-
tion deficits after lateral intrapari-
etal area inactivation in monkeys.
J. Neurosci. 22, 9877–9884.
Watanabe, M., Cheng, K., Murayama,
Y., Ueno, K., Asamizuya, T.,
Tanaka, K., et al. (2011). Attention
but not awareness modulates
the BOLD signal in the human
V1 during binocular suppres-
sion. Science 334, 829–831. doi:
10.1126/science.1203161
Wehrle, R., Kaufmann, C., Wetter,
T. C., Holsboer, F., Auer, D. P.,
Pollmacher, T., et al. (2007).
Functional microstates within
human REM sleep: first evidence
from fMRI of a thalamocorti-
cal network specific for phasic
REM periods. Eur. J. Neurosci. 25,
863–871. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.
2007.05314.x
Whyte, J., and Myers, R. (2009).
Incidence of clinically signif-
icant responses to zolpidem
among patients with disorders
of consciousness: a prelimi-
nary placebo controlled trial.
Am. J. Phys. Med. Rehabil. 88,
410–418. doi: 10.1097/PHM.0b013
e3181a0e3a0
Wilke, M., Kagan, I., and Andersen,
R. A. (2012). Functional imaging
reveals rapid reorganization of cor-
tical activity after parietal inactiva-
tion in monkeys. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 109, 8274–8279. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1204789109
Wilke, M., Logothetis, N. K., and
Leopold, D. A. (2003). Generalized
flash suppression of salient visual
targets. Neuron 39, 1043–1052. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2003.08.003
Wilke, M., Logothetis, N. K., and
Leopold, D. A. (2006). Local
field potential reflects perceptual
suppression in monkey visual
cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 103, 17507–17512. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0604673103
Wilke, M., Mueller, K. M., and Leopold,
D. A. (2009). Neural activity in
the visual thalamus reflects percep-
tual suppression. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 106, 9465–9470. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0900714106
Williams, Z. M., Elfar, J. C., Eskandar,
E. N., Toth, L. J., and Assad, J.
A. (2003). Parietal activity and the
perceived direction of ambiguous
apparent motion. Nat. Neurosci. 6,
616–623. doi: 10.1038/nn1055
Wunderlich, K., Schneider, K. A., and
Kastner, S. (2005). Neural corre-
lates of binocular rivalry in the
human lateral geniculate nucleus.
Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1595–1602. doi:
10.1038/nn1554
Wyart, V., Tallon-Baudry, C. (2009).
How ongoing fluctuations in
human visual cortex predict per-
ceptual awareness: baseline shift
versus decision bias. J. Neurosci.
29, 8715–8725. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.0962-09.2009
Yizhar, O., Fenno, L. E., Davidson,
T. J., Mogri, M., and Deisseroth,
K. (2011). Optogenetics in neu-
ral systems. Neuron 71, 9–34. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2011.06.004
Yoshida, M., Takaura, K., Kato, R.,
Ikeda, T., and Isa, T. (2008). Striate
cortical lesions affect deliberate
decision and control of sac-
cade: implication for blindsight.
J. Neurosci. 28, 10517–10530.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1973-08.
2008
Zimmermann, J., Goebel, R., De
Martino, F., van de Moortele, P.
F., Feinberg, D., Adriany, G., et al.
(2011). Mapping the organization
of axis of motion selective features
in human area MT using high-field
fMRI. PLoS ONE 6:e28716. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0028716
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 11 March 2013; accepted:
24 August 2013; published online: 31
October 2013.
Citation: Boly M, Seth AK, Wilke M,
Ingmundson P, Baars B, Laureys S,
Edelman DB and Tsuchiya N (2013)
Consciousness in humans and non-
human animals: recent advances and
future directions. Front. Psychol. 4:625.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00625
This article was submitted to
Consciousness Research, a section of
the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Boly, Seth, Wilke,
Ingmundson, Baars, Laureys, Edelman
and Tsuchiya. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or repro-
duction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licen-
sor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic prac-
tice. No use, distribution or reproduction
is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 625 | 20
